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Bank resolution and creditor distribution:
the tension shaping global banking –Part II:
The cross-border dimension1
David Ramos2
Javier Solana3
New bank resolution frameworks that aim to address the
complex task of managing the collapse of a large financial
institution stand in considerable tension with basic principles
and policy objectives of insolvency law. In this two-part study,
we present an analytical framework that aims at helping us
understand how this tension can undermine the effectiveness of
the new bank resolution frameworks. In the first part of this
article, we introduced our three-layered framework and explored
its first two layers: the group dimension, and the duality of
crisis-prevention and crisis-management tools. In this Part II, we
explore the last layer: the cross-border dimension. As in Part I,
we reflect on the practical challenges that resolution authorities
are likely to face when implementing the new resolution
frameworks. In addition, we use the insights from our analysis to
reflect on the impact that these new bank resolution frameworks
will have on the governance of international financial markets
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the first part of this two-part article, we described how the new
bank resolution frameworks that regulators in various jurisdictions
developed to address the complex task of managing the collapse of large
financial institutions stand in considerable tension with basic principles
and policy objectives of insolvency law. We also presented an analytical
framework that unpacks bank resolution into three layers of growing
complexity: the group dimension, the duality of crisis-prevention and
crisis-management tools, and the cross-border dimension. In Part I, we
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examined the first two layers. In Part II, we resume the analysis and
explore the third and final layer: the cross-border dimension.
In Section II, we describe the policies and principles underpinning
cross-border insolvency and resolution. We also discuss the frameworks
of cross-border insolvency and resolution, and the issues of applicable
law, mutual recognition and cooperation. We then develop a critical
analysis of cross-border resolution frameworks, focusing on the
possibility of using principles underlying cross-border insolvency
frameworks as a reference, and illustrating how it is mired in uncertainty,
particularly as a result of unresolved frictions between principles and
polices.
In Section III, we provide a more practical analysis of how crossborder resolution rules apply to the four operational liabilities that we
identified in the first part as the object of our study: deposits, client
money and client assets, liabilities arising from derivatives, and
subordinated debt.
In Section IV we bring together the three layers in our analytical
framework. We first examine the risks of applying crisis management
tools to bank groups with cross-border operations. In particular, we
analyse how the different treatment of a bank group’s critical functions
across the different jurisdictions in which it operates can thwart the
coordination of resolution action at the global level. We then examine
how the responses that regulatory authorities have given to these
difficulties in crisis-management have resulted in the crisis-prevention
tools that try to “balkanize” bank groups by disincentivising global
business operations. In Section V, we argue that this is likely to turn
bank groups into large, local ad intervened liquidity islands.

II.

THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY AND RESOLUTION

The cross-border dimension continues to reflect the inner conflicts
between insolvency and bank resolution discussed in the first part of this
paper. First, we offer a brief explanation of how the tensions at the level
of policy and principle mutate when we move to the context of crossborder insolvency and resolution (A). Secondly, we examine how, in the
EU’s regional framework, cross-border resolution builds upon crossborder insolvency, which gives rise to a robust system (B). Then we
consider the (non) applicability of the cross-border insolvency system to
cross-border resolution at the global level, and how this leaves a flawed
patchwork of halfway solutions that endangers the whole system (C).
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A. Cross-border Insolvency and Resolution: Policies and
Principles
Cross-border insolvency has long been characterized by the debate
between universalist and territorialist views. Universalists claim that a
single procedure should apply to each entity, with a single law that is
recognized across borders, in the name of efficiency (transaction costwise) and fairness (with a single legal background to be used as a
baseline to assess each party’s relative position).4 Territorialist views
would retort that, by vesting powers in a foreign authority, the
universalist vision does not guarantee the interest of creditors located in a
different jurisdiction, which is something that the authorities of that latter
jurisdiction are bound to protect.5 In our analysis of the possible frictions
between bank resolution and insolvency law, an evident question arises:
how does the system cope when, on top of cross-border insolvency law
and its universalism-territorialism compromise, one adds bank
resolution, with its different menu of policies?
The two aspects in which bank resolution is more likely to alter the
picture are summarized by the words “contagion” and “group”. At first
glance, the objective of avoiding contagion could make the case for
territorialistic, i.e. balkanized, solutions to limit cross-border spill-over
effects and protect against two important concerns: home country
authorities’ disregard of creditors in other countries and home taxpayers’
refusal to bail-out foreign creditors if the source of distress is perceived
to be outside the home jurisdiction.6 Yet such attitudes fail to grasp the
complexity of multinational banking groups.7 For example, if critical
functions are situated in a specific jurisdiction, a territorialist approach
would impair those critical functions, wreaking havoc across the whole

4

Jay L. Westbrook “A Global Solution to Multinational Default” Michigan Law Review
Vol. 98 (2000) p. 2277.
5
Thus, recent experiences like the Fortis bank, or Icelandic banks were to some extent
characterized by territorialist approaches. Jonathan M. Edwards “A Model Law
Framework for The Resolution of G-SIFIs” Capital Markets Law Journal Vol. 7 (2012)
pp. 131-133.
6
See, e.g. Rosa Lastra (ed.) Cross-Border Bank Insolvency Oxford University Press,
2011, p. 166.
7
James M. Peck “Cross-Border Observations Derived from my Lehman Judicial
Experience” Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law Vol. 30
(2015) p. 132.
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bank entity or group, without improving the prospects of creditors in that
jurisdiction.8 The problem is an intricate one due to the conflict between
the interests of national authorities, and it is aggravated by asymmetries
of resources, accounting, legal and institutional infrastructures, and
resolution regimes.9 Early theoretical analyses made the point that
ignoring cross-border externalities leads to globally inefficient outcomes,
e.g. under-provision of recapitalizations.10 Since then, the debate has
shifted away from bail-outs and towards bail-in, but the basic tensions
remain the same. Using the concept of “trilemma” for open economies,11
Schoenmaker argued that, between financial stability, financial
integration and national financial policies, it is only possible to pick two
out of the three.12 This has been used in the field of bank crises to justify
a two-way choice in a three-way trilemma between global financial

8

Creditors would be comparably better off only if liquid assets were “located” in that
jurisdiction, but that does not need to be coincident with the jurisdiction where critical
functions are located. For example, imagine that the treasury functions are located in one
jurisdiction, which means that the specific branch or entity is the one organizing liquidity
management or hedging operations across the group, but that, in order to do so, it relies
on collateral assets deposited with entities in other jurisdictions. It could also happen that
the group treats the collateral as being deposited with the treasury branch/entity, but that
in practice this entity relies on long, cross-border custody chains, where the treasury
entity’s “ownership” of the collateral only derives from an electronic entry in the books
of other custodian entities or central securities depositories in other jurisdictions.
Ultimately, using a purely territorialist approach, if resolution were declared in each of
these jurisdictions, the authorities of the country where each central securities depository
is located could freeze the assets there and claim jurisdiction over them.
9
Ibid p. 30. The authors argue that obstacles may be overcome primarily in cases where
the failure of a bank and its branches or subsidiaries has systemic impact in both home
and host countries, and even then it is far from sure.
10
X. Freixas “Crisis Management in Europe” In J. Gremers, D. Schoenmaker; P. Wierts
(eds.) Financial Supervision in Europe Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2003) pp. 102–19.
11
Obstfeld and Taylor proposed the original “open economy", where a country that
considers capital mobility, fixed exchange rates and monetary autonomy cannot have all
three and must necessarily pick only two of them. See Maurice Obstfeld; Alan Taylor
"The Great Depression as a Watershed: International Capital Mobility over the Long
Run," in Michael Bordo; Claudia D. Goldin; Eugene N. White, (eds.) The Defining
Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century
University of Chicago Press (1998), pp. 353-402. Dani Rodrik described his own
“augmented trilemma” between “integrated national economies”, “nation state” and
“mass politics”. See “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?” Journal of
Economic Perspectives Vol. 14 No. 1 (2000) pp. 177-186.
12
Dirk Shoenmaker “The financial trilemma” Economic Letters 111 (2011) pp. 57-59.

250

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:245

stability, cross-border banks, and national authorities:13 countries can
only foster global financial stability and global banks by handing over
part of their sovereignty.14
Sovereignty is rarely relinquished in full. Thus, the ideal solution
would be a pre-commitment to mutual recognition and coordination. This
could take the form of (i) a centralized system with central powers and
authorities, such as the one inside the Eurozone; or a fully harmonized
system, as in the EU, which tries to accomplish single-jurisdiction
status;15 (ii) a system of common rules, such as an international
convention on cross-border bank resolution,16 or an international model
law;17 and, in its absence, (iii) a combination of reliance on cross-border
bank insolvency principles, unilateral recognition of resolution action and
contractual solutions (see section II.C below).

B. Regional Approaches (EU and Eurozone): When Crossborder Resolution Builds Upon Cross-border Insolvency
The EU offers the single existing example of a regionally integrated
area with different countries that try to appear as a “single jurisdiction”
for purposes of bank resolution rules.18 To minimize the risk of
divergence, however, the outcome of applying common bank resolution
rules must not be altered by the applicable insolvency law, which differs
from country to country. The first step to enhance certainty and
predictability is to ascertain what is the law applicable to “normal
insolvency proceedings” on ranking and priorities, the formula used by
bank resolution rules.19 This is the law of the “home Member State”

13

Stijn Claessens; Richard J. Herring; Dirk Shoenmaker; Kimberly A. Summe “A Safer
World Financial System: Improving the Resolution of Systemic Institutions” Geneva
Reports on the World Economy 12 (2010) p. 32.
14
Ibid p. 33.
15
See section II.B below.
16
Institute of International Finance (IIF), Making Resolution Robust – Completing the
Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Effective Cross-Border Resolution of Financial
Institutions (June 2012).
17
See Mattias Lehmann “Bail-In and Private International Law: How to Make Bank
Resolution Measures Effective across Borders” International and Comparative Law
Quarterly Vol. 66 (Jan. 2017) pp. 107-142; or Irit Mevorach “Beyond the Search for
Certainty: Addressing the Cross-Border Resolution Gap” Brooklyn Journal of Corp. Fin.
& Com. L. Vol. 10 (2015) pp. 183-223.
18
EBA Final Report on MREL EBA-Op-2016-21| 14 December 2016, PP. 16, 49.
19
See Article 44 BRRD. The relevant texts to determine the law applicable to insolvency
proceedings in the EU are the Directive 2001/24/EC on the reorganisation and winding
up of credit institutions (the Winding-Up Directive), and Regulation 878/2015 on
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under cross-border bank insolvency rules,20 a more predictable factor
than the more uncertain “centre of main interest” (“COMI”) that is used
in general cross-border insolvency rules.21 The “home Member State”
will determine the law applicable to supervision, resolution and
insolvency of the relevant institution.
Furthermore, general cross-border insolvency rules in the EU are
universalist in nature and recognize “main” insolvency proceedings, but
they also recognise ‘secondary insolvency proceedings’ in the place of a
company’s establishment.22 Bank cross-border insolvency rules are even
more universalist and do not recognize secondary insolvency
proceedings.23 There are exceptions for rights in re over assets located in
a State different from the home State,24 and set-off and close-out netting
rights subject to different contract laws.25 These exceptions are not very
relevant for our purposes because these rights are typically protected
from harm in bank resolution cases, but they could have a significant
impact in other cases.26

International Insolvency Proceedings (the International Insolvency Regulation). Some
authors have used this to propose different mechanisms for recapitalising banks. See, e.g.
Charles Goodhart; Dirk Shoenmaker “Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking
Crises” International Journal of Central Banking Vol. 5 No. 1 (2009) pp.141-165.
20
See Article 10 (2) of the Winding-Up Directive. According to article 2 of the WindingUp Directive, the reference to “home Member State” shall be interpreted in accordance
with article 4 (1) (43) of Regulation 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation, or
CRR), which refers to the Member State in which ‘an institution has been granted
authorisation’.
21
See Articles 3 (1) and 7 (1) of the Insolvency Regulation. Article 7 (2) (i) of the
International Insolvency Regulation stipulates that the law of the COMI determines
ranking and priorities. Despite the more vague definition there is a presumption in favour
of the place of the registered office (see article 3(1) para. 2nd). The presumption was
strengthened by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case C-341/04
Eurofood [2006] ECR I-3854, where the Court seemed to imply that, in order to destroy
the presumption in favor of the registered office, it would be necessary to demonstrate
that the Company is a “letterbox Company” (ibid at 35), which is the test for cases of
abuse of law. See case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-8031 para. 68 (a tax
case where the Court made reference to the “letterbox company”, and the Eurofood case
as the test that should be met to prove abuse of law).
22
See Article 3 (2) EU Insolvency Regulation; article 2 (c) and (f) UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.
23
See e.g. recital (16) Winding Up Directive.
24
See Articles 21, 24 Winding Up Directive.
25
Articles 23 and 25 Winding Up Directive.
26
Mattias Lehmann “Bail-In and Private International Law: How to Make Bank
Resolution Measures Effective across Borders” cit. pp. 117-119.
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More problematic is the fact that creditors located in States other
than the home State have the right to lodge claims and to “be treated in
the same way and accorded the same ranking as claims of an equivalent
nature which may be lodged by creditors having their domiciles, normal
places of residence, or head offices in the home Member State.”27 Since
“ranking” is a matter for the lex concursus,28 should “equivalence” be
solely determined by the lex concursus as well, or limited in any way by
the law under which the claims were originated?29 This should not
obscure the fact that using a single insolvency law for private rights is an
intrusion, and some legal systems are reluctant to allow a law other than
the lex contractus to govern variations in the contract,30 which creates
obstacles to accept the applicability of such law if the procedure is not
characterized as “insolvency” or equivalent, e.g. restructuring
procedures.31
The second step to enhance certainty and predictability is to ensure
an automatic recognition of decisions across different jurisdictions. The
Winding-Up Directive grants decisions the same effect in other EU
countries that they have in the home Member State.32 The CJEU has
reinforced the idea of automatic recognition against different objections.

27

Article 16 Winding Up Directive. (Emphasis added.)
Article 10 (2) (h) of the Bank Winding Up Directive.
29
Recital (15) of the Directive seems to support an exclusive determination by the lex
concursus, by stating that: “The exemption concerning the effects of reorganisation
measures and winding-up proceedings on certain contracts and rights is limited to those
effects and does not cover other questions concerning reorganisation measures and
winding-up proceedings such as the lodging, verification, admission and ranking of
claims concerning those contracts and rights and the rules governing the distribution of
the proceeds of the realisation of the assets, which are governed by the law of the home
Member State.” However, if the classification of a specific claim is a matter of public
policy in the country where the claim is originated, it is difficult to conclude that the lex
concursus would be unchecked.
30
Simon Gleeson “Chapter 5. The Consequences of Chapter 14 for International
Recognition of US Bank Resolution Action” in Thomas H Jackson; Kenneth Scott; John
Taylor Making Failure Feasible: How Bankruptcy Reform Can End Too Big to Fail
Hoover Institution, Stanford University Press, 2015, p. 113.
31
Ibid with reference to National Bank of Greece and Athens SA v. Metliss [1958] AC
509 (House of Lords); Adams v. National Bank of Greece [1961] AC 255 (House of
Lords); Global Distressed Alpha Fund 1 v. P. T. Bakrie, 2011] EWHC 256 (Commercial
court).
32
See Article 3 (1) and (2) and 9 (1) para. 2nd of the Winding-Up Directive. The
forerunner is the system of the Brussels Convention, now Brussels Regulation 44/2001
on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments on Civil and Commercial Matters (now
recast as Regulation 1215/2012), which laid the ground for the Insolvency Regulation
and the Winding-Up Directive.
28
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For example, in case C-85/12 LBI, two attachment orders against an
Icelandic bank succeeded despite the fact that the measures were based
on legislative provisions rather than acts of administrative or judicial
authorities.33 The EFTA Court for the European Economic Area (EEA)
also upheld the principle of automatic recognition in E-28/13 LBI hf v
Merrill Lynch International Ltd,34 relying on LBI to hold that all states
must recognize that the home state and its law determine the validity or
voidability of detrimental acts, and that this must be subject only to
narrowly construed exceptions, which did not apply in a case where
Icelandic law determined the avoidance of bond payments despite the
agency agreement, the bonds and their payment coupons being subject to
English law.35
BRRD rules superimpose themselves upon this scheme, and the
measures subject to mutual recognition under the Winding Up Directive

33

Case C-85/12 LBI hf v Kepler Capital Markets SA and Frédéric Giraux, 24 October
2013. The Icelandic measures, consisting in a prohibition of legal actions against entities
benefitting from a moratorium, were considered effective in France. The combination of
legislative measures (including retroactive amendments) conditional upon judicial or
administrative action were considered subject to automatic mutual recognition, as there
had been such judicial measures. Regarding the fact that the legislative measures
themselves were not subject to challenge, the Court held that: ‘In the context of the
system established by Directive 2001/24, the reorganisation and winding-up measures of
the home Member State are, as is apparent from the second subparagraph of Article 3(2)
and the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of that directive, recognised “without any
further formalities”. In particular, that directive does not make the recognition of
reorganisation and winding- up measures subject to a condition that it be possible to bring
an action against them. Similarly, according to the second subparagraph of Article 3(2),
the host Member State may likewise not make that recognition subject to a condition of
that type for which its national rules may provide.’ Case C-85/12 LBI hf v Kepler Capital
Markets SA and Frédéric Giraux, 24 October 2013 at 40. The attachment orders were
considered “enforcement actions” and thus subject to the home Member State jurisdiction
rather than “lawsuits pending” subject to the law of the State where the lawsuit is
pending. Ibid paras. 51-58, with reference to article 32 of the Winding Up Directive.
34
E-28/13 LBI hf v Merrill Lynch International Ltd, 17 October 2014.
35
Ibid at 73. The contention was over article 30 (1) of the Winding Up Directive, which
provides that: ‘Article 10 shall not apply as regards the rules relating to the validity,
voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to the creditors as a whole, where
the beneficiary of these acts provides proof that: — the act detrimental to the creditors as
a whole is subject to the law of a Member State other than the home Member State, and
— that law does not allow any means of challenging that act in the case in point.’ The
defendant would have needed to prove the non-voidability of the acts pursuant to the
English laws that would be applicable in the case (including insolvency law, contract law,
statutes of limitation, etc).
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now include resolution measures.36 If anything, the mutual recognition
principle has been reinforced, since BRRD articles 63 et seq. of BRRD
directly regulate the powers of resolution authorities and the applicable
safeguards instead of relying on national law. Article 66 of the BRRD,
which regulates the power to enforce crisis management measures or
crisis prevention measures by other Member States, provides a broad
principle of effectiveness and recognition for transfers of shares and
instruments of ownership, assets, rights or liabilities in States other than
the state of the resolution authority where these may be located,37
together with a duty to provide the resolution authority with the
necessary assistance for effecting such transfers.38 For bail-in measures
adopted by the resolution authority, article 66 of the BRRD provides the
recognition in the State whose law governs the instruments and in the
State where the creditors are located.39 While effectiveness in the State
whose law governs the instruments is logical, the reference to the State
of location of creditors is problematic if a creditor is located in a Member
State but the liabilities are governed by a third country’s laws because
any interference would hardly be justified, even on public policy
grounds.40 Finally, article 66 of the BRRD subjects the safeguards
applicable to transfers or bail-in measures, and the rights of shareholders,
creditors or third parties to challenge them, to the laws of the resolution
authority’s State and excludes any right to challenge under the laws of
their own jurisdictions.41
Despite the clear intention of the EU legislature, court
pronouncements show that the devil is often in the details. The first of
those is the Goldman Sachs v. Novo Banco case,42 where Banco de
Portugal (“BdP”), as resolution authority for Banco Espirito Santo
(“BES”), a major Portuguese bank, made a series of decisions to transfer
some of BES’ assets and liabilities to a bridge bank, Novo Banco
(“NB”), leaving others behind. In a first decision (the “August
decision”), BdP indicated the types of liabilities that would be
transferred, which included a loan facility subscribed by BES with Oak

36

See new no. (4) of article 1, and article 2 of the Winding-Up Directive, introduced by
article 117 of BRRD. See also recital (119) of BRRD.
37
Article 66 (1) BRRD.
38
Article 66 (2) BRRD.
39
Article 66 (4) BRRD.
40
Mattias Lehmann “Bail-In and Private International Law: How to Make Bank
Resolution Measures Effective across Borders” cit. p. 125.
41
Article 66 (3) (5) and (6) BRRD.
42
Goldman Sachs v Novo Banco, [2015] EWHC 2371 (Comm).
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Finance Luxembourg (“Oak”). Later, however, BdP stated in another
decision (the “December decision”) that the loan facility subscribed by
BES with Oak would not be transferred to the bridge bank.
The loan facility was expressly subject to English law and to the
jurisdiction of English courts. Thus, Goldman Sachs, as assignee of
Oak’s claim under the loan facility, sought repayment of the loan from
NB arguing that English courts had jurisdiction to determine whether NB
was a party to the loan facility entered into by BES as its predecessor,
despite NB not being a signatory. Goldman Sachs further argued that the
December decision was equivocal because, while it purported to
“transfer”, it merely declared a “no transfer”, which, Goldman Sachs
argued, was not within the express powers granted to BdP under the
BRRD.
The commercial court found for Goldman Sachs, holding that the
BES’ liability under the loan facility had been transferred to NB and that
the latter was therefore bound by the English jurisdiction clause. The
judge based its decision on the Brussels I Regulation, which is conceived
for civil disputes outside times of crisis, holding that the case was a
contractual matter. Only then did the court turn to the BRRD. The court
adopted a narrow formal interpretation of the term “transfer” under
article 66 of the BRRD and found that the December decision fell outside
its scope.43
This narrow interpretation was overturned by the Court of Appeal,
which held that the December decision was a “reorganisation measure”
in the sense of the Bank Winding-Up Directive and thus fell within the
scope of mutual recognition.44 Thus, the December decision had to be
given effect by the English courts and NB was “not a party” to the loan
facility extended to BES at the time of the August decision. 45 This
decision was recently upheld by the UK Supreme Court in even more
rotund terms.46
Another EU precedent concerned the resolution of Heta, a specific
entity created in 2014 by an ad hoc act to manage the crisis of the Hypo

43

See Goldman Sachs v Novo Banco, [2015] EWHC 2371 (Comm) at 94.
See [2016] EWCA Civ 1092, 4 November 2016, paras 24-34. The UK Court of
Appeals relied on the broader interpretation of “reorganisation measures” under art 2 of
Directive 2001/24 laid out in the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union
of Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenije (Case C-526/14).
45
See [2016] EWCA Civ 1092, paras 36-39.
46
See [2018] UKSC 34, paras 27, 28.
44
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Alpe Adria group.47 The ad hoc act provided for the annulment of certain
financial obligations. Once the BRRD was transposed into Austrian law,
the Austrian legislature passed another act to resolve Heta despite it not
being a credit institution. Also, as a mechanism to protect taxpayers, the
act cancelled or introduced a 15-month moratorium in the debt
instrument issued by Hypo Alpe and Heta as a pre-condition for the
valuation of the entity and the application of resolution tools, including
the identification of “bail-in-able” liabilities.
Some of the debt had been acquired by the public bank Bayern LB,
which challenged the Austrian decision before the Münich court. The
court refused to grant cross-border recognition48 because, firstly, these
were not “reorganisation” or “recapitalisation” measures but
“liquidation” measures, and they did not concern a bank but another
institution;49 and, secondly, the administrative act adopting the measures
merely transposed a legislative act, which was not among the acts subject
to recognition. Having rejected the application of BRRD or the Winding
Up Directive, the court also refused to grant the measure the status of a
public policy measure under article 9(3) of Rome I Regulation, since its
purpose was not to protect financial stability, but rather Austrian public
finances, and to the detriment of German creditors.50
These are puzzling arguments. The view that a court can subject
recognition to a sort of “pedigree” test, where it examines the purposes
for which the measures are used, seems at odds with the automatic
recognition system that lies at the core of the BRRD and the Bank
Winding Up Directive.51 The objection based on the legislative nature of
the act seems to have been explicitly rejected by the CJEU in LBI.52

47

Heta’s purpose was to wind down Hypo Alpe’s assets. See Mattias Lehmann “Bail-In
and Private International Law: How to Make Bank Resolution Measures Effective across
Borders” cit. p. 133.
48
BayernLB v Hypo Alpe Adria (HETA case) Regional Court, Munich I, judgment of 8
May 2015,
BeckRS 2015,
15096.
Available at:
http://www.gesetzebayern.de/(X(1)S(fngr2brnlkwonln4pai0cuz3))/Content/Document/Y-300-Z-BECKRSB-2015-N-15096?hl=true&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1
49
Ibid.
50
Bayern LB v Hypo Alpe Adria (HETA case) Regional Court, Munich I, judgment of 8
May 2015, BeckRS 2015, 15096.
51
Aside from covering ‘winding up’ proceedings, pursuant to article 9 (1) of the
Directive these encompass ‘winding up proceedings concerning a credit institution’,
which could cover Heta proceedings, because they concerned Hypo Alpe, i.e. a bank.
52
Case C-85/12 LBI hf v Kepler Capital Markets SA and Frédéric Giraux, 24 October
2013.
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Then, protecting public funds is a (public policy) goal of the BRRD.53
Unfortunately, since the specific act was annulled by the Austrian
Constitutional Court on grounds that it unfairly discriminated between
creditors,54 a sensible ground that was not at the core of the German
decision, there was no appeal and the German decision became final.
The Novo Banco and Hypo Alpe Adria decisions exemplify the
importance of some of the basic ideas discussed here. In both cases,
courts clung to open-textured concepts to narrow-down the rules’ scope
of application: for example, a decision to “transfer” in the commercial
court ruling in Novo Banco, or the applicability of the rules to “credit
institutions” and to administrative measures by a “resolution authority”
in the Hypo Alpe Adria case. While the mere textual readings were
excessively formalistic and hard to justify, beneath them lay a concern
over the fair treatment of creditors, which in itself is justified as
reflective of public policy. Creditor treatment matters for bank
resolution, but it is placed in a broader framework where more macro
interests, such as contagion or market discipline, are a driving force.55 In
this context, courts may perceive that not only do the “micro” goals yield
to the “macro” ones, but also basic principles that establish rights such as
“equal treatment” are being trumped. Even if such a conclusion is wrong,
it does not aid the cause of mutual recognition that the decision is
perceived as illegitimate,56 which happens when the process is
characterized by a lack of transparency and justification, and a degree of
improvisation
and
inconsistency,
as
shown
by
BdP’s
amendment/clarification of its transfer decision or the Austrian
authorities’ discriminatory treatment of creditors.
It is therefore not correct to criticize the court rulings without also
criticizing the decisions they reviewed and, we admit, it is unfair to lay
the blame at the doorstep of public authorities which were learning by
doing. Yet in both cases, the courts refused to enforce decisions despite
the applicable legal framework, indicating a clear intent to (i) supersede
the normal framework of contracts and civil disputes, and (ii) foster a
system of automatic recognition. Indeed, within EU bank resolution

53

Article 31 includes among “resolution objectives” the need “(b) to avoid a significant
adverse effect on the financial system, in particular by preventing contagion, including to
market infrastructures, and by maintaining market discipline”; and (c) to protect public
funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support”.
54
See Mattias Lehmann “Bail-In and Private International Law: How to Make Bank
Resolution Measures Effective across Borders” cit. p. 133.
55
See Part I, section II.B.
56
See Part I, section II.C.
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rules, cross-border provisions may be the ones that try to address the
tensions of policy and principle in a clearer manner. If one wishes to
identify the main source of uncertainty in this context, it is not in the
rules themselves or in their intent, but in the tensions at the level of
policy and principle in non-cross-border provisions and in the absence of
legitimate processes to resolve them in each specific case.

C. International Approaches: When Cross-border Resolution
does not Build upon Cross-border Insolvency
A legal framework for cross-border cooperation is a key attribute of
effective resolution systems.57 Such framework should include rules that
encourage cooperation and information exchange, a prohibition to
automatically trigger domestic resolution action as a result of foreign
proceedings, a prohibition of discriminatory treatment of foreign
creditors, rules that give effect to resolution decisions of foreign
authorities through mutual recognition or the unilateral exercise of
powers under domestic law, and the power to deal with local branches of
foreign banks.58 The state of current rules is far from this benchmark:
there are insufficient rules to ease cooperation and recognition, and
creditors are not treated equally.59 This made it necessary to develop
frameworks of recommendations for statutory and contract solutions to
enhance cross-border recognition.60
Yet cross-border insolvency provides a promising precedent, which
could have been used as a basis to then develop the specialties for bank
resolution. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
provides an international standard for domestic laws,61 based on a
“modified universalist” model:62 the debtor’s Centre-of-Main-Interest

57

FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions October
2011 (updated 2014) Key Attribute (KA) no. 7.
58
KA 7, nos. 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.5.
59
FSB Thematic Review on Resolution Regimes. Peer Review Report 11 April 2013, pp.
29-31, Annex D, Table 6.
60
FSB Cross-border recognition of resolution action Consultative document, 29
September 2014.
61
It is the blueprint for the laws of countries such as the United Kingdom, Poland,
Romania, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, or Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy
Code, to name some. See the status of the UNCITRAL Model Law in
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html
62
See, e.g. Jason Fincke ‘Coordinating Cross-Border Bankruptcy: How Territoriality
saves Universalism’ Columbia Journal of European Law Vol. 15 (2008) p. 43. For a
classification of models, see Donald T. Trautman; Jay Lawrence Westbrook; Emmanuel
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(COMI) determines the place of the “main proceedings,” the jurisdiction
of the courts, and applicable laws,63 with concessions for rights in rem
and “territorial proceedings.”64 Cross-filing of claims is possible, and
foreign creditors must not be treated worse than local ones.65 Courts have
used these rules to recognise foreign insolvency proceedings, relied on
foreign precedents to interpret Model Law concepts,66 engaged with the
substance of the facts to determine the COMI even in cases involving
jurisdictions well-known as a base for shell companies,67 and refused
recognition in light of facts, rather than prejudice or discrimination.68
Thus, if the UNCITRAL framework is successful, why can it not be
used as the basis for cross-border resolution action? Should it be used for
that purpose? It is evenly balanced and provides open-textured concepts
susceptible of interpretation together with key principles such as nondiscrimination. It has proven useful to deal with typical bank creditors,
such as bondholders69 or “financial” debtors, such as financial advisors,70
financial companies,71 funds,72 insurance companies73 or even banks.74

Gaillard ‘Four Models of International Bankruptcy’ American Journal of Comparative
Law Vol. 41 (1993) p. 573.
63
Article 17 (1) (recognition) and 17 (2) (a) (recognition as main proceeding) in relation
with article 2 (b) of the UNCITRAL Model Law
64
If the entity has an ‘establishment’. Article 17 (1), 17 (2) (b) (recognition) in relation
with article 2 (c) (foreign ‘non-main proceedings’) and 2 (f) (definition of
‘establishment’) UNCITRAL Model Law.
65
Articles 9 et seq. UNCITRAL Model Law.
66
For example, US courts have used the CJEU Eurofood case in numerous occasions.
See, for example, In re Schefenacker No. 07-11482 (Bankr. SDNY June 14, 2007),
67
For example, In re Amerindo Internet Growth Fund Ltd (Bankr. SDNY Feb. 9 2007);
In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re
Am. Pegasus, SPC, Case No. 11-34429 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011); Ackers v Saad
Investments Company Limited (in official liquidation) [2010] FCA 1221 (Cayman
Islands), In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. C Dist. Cal. 2006) (St.
Vincent and the Grenadines), or In re: Gerova Financial Group, Ltd., 482 B.R. 86 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2012); Re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Limited, No. 11
Civ. 7865 (LBS) (SDNY 25 June 2012) (Bermuda), or In re Spencer Partners Ltd No. 0702356-JC (Bankr. South Carolina, 29 May 2007) (Isle of Man).
68
See, e.g. In re SphinX Ltd 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr. SDNY, 2006); In re Bear Stearns
High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. SDNY
2007).
69
In re Schefenacker No. 07-11482 (Bankr. SDNY June 14, 2007).
70
See, e.g. In re Ian Gregory Thow, No. 05-30432 (Bankr. W.Dist. Wash Seattle, 2005).
71
Ackers v Saad Investments Company Limited (in official liquidation) [2010] FCA
1221; In re: Gerova Financial Group, Ltd., 482 B.R. 86 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
72
In re SphinX Ltd 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr. SDNY, 2006); In re Bear Stearns High-Grade
Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. SDNY 2007); In re
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There are two main objections to the UNCITRAL framework. One,
cross-border insolvency rules cannot be used when they are excluded.75
Two, they should not be used because resolution authorities, and not
courts, are preponderant, and resolution policies and principles differ
from those of insolvency.
Regarding the first objection, some laws expressly exclude banks and
financial companies from insolvency, both domestic and cross-border,
like the US.76 Some authors say that the case is the same in the UK, due
to the separate treatment of resolution and insolvency.77 Yet the question
is whether the presence of a bank should automatically exclude the
application of the UNCITRAL framework. If one looks at the
UNCITRAL Model Law guide to enactment, the answer seems to be
“no”: the guide states that the exclusion of banks should not rule out the

Amerindo Internet Growth Fund Ltd (Bankr. SDNY Feb. 9 2007); Re Millennium Global
Emerging Credit Master Fund Limited, No. 11 Civ. 7865 (LBS) (SDNY 25 June 2012).
73
HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd, [2008] UKHL 21; In re Tri-Continental
Exchange Ltd 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. C Dist. Cal. 2006); Re European Insurance Agency
AS (unreported court order) No. 6-BS30434, 8 August 2006.
74
In re The International Banking Corporation B.S.C. 439 B.R. 614 (SDNY 2012); Re
JSC BTA Bank No. 10-10638 (JMP) (Bankr. SDNY 23 August 2010).
75
Article 1 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency states that:
‘This Law does not apply to a proceeding concerning [designate any types of entities,
such as banks or insurance companies, that are subject to a special insolvency regime in
this State and that this State wishes to exclude from this Law].’ Section 109 (b) (2) and
(3) of the US Bankruptcy Code excludes Banks and foreign Banks from the consideration
as “debtors” for purposes of bankruptcy law.
76
See Section § 1501 (c) (1), with reference to Section § 109 (b) of the US Bankruptcy
Code. Section 109 (b) (3) (B) also excludes foreign banks with branches or agencies in
the United States. See Paul Lee “Cross-Border Resolution of Banking Groups:
International Initiatives and US Perspectives: Part III” Pratt’s Journal of Bankruptcy Law
(2014) p. 295. Section II of the Dodd Frank Act, which regulates the Orderly Liquidation
Authority, is even more explicit, when it states that ‘The provisions of this title shall
exclusively apply to and govern all matters relating to covered financial companies for
which the Corporation is appointed as receiver, and no provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code or the rules issued thereunder shall apply in such cases, except as expressly
provided in this title.’
77
Simon Gleeson “The Consequences of Chapter 14 for International Recognition of US
Bank Resolution Action” in Thomas H Jackson; Kenneth Scott; John Taylor Making
Failure Feasible: How Bankruptcy Reform Can End Too Big to Fail Hoover Institution,
Stanford University Press, 2015, p. 118. The chapter analyses a hypothetical Chapter 14
of the US Bankruptcy Code, but the argument permits extrapolation to the existing law:
UK courts would have to determine, for purposes of recognition, whether foreign (US)
resolution proceedings are “insolvency” proceedings, drawing an equivalence with UK
law, where the powers are conferred part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 (resolution), and not
part 2 (bank insolvency).
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rules in cases where the assets or branches are not subject to a regulatory
scheme that justifies a different treatment,78 nor limit the right of a court
or insolvency representative in a foreign bank to seek assistance using
Model Law provisions.79
This logic was put into action in In re Irish Bank Resolution
Corporation Ltd.80 Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) was a
bridge bank institution that succeeded two Irish private banks (Anglo
Irish Bank Corporation and Irish Nationwide Building Society) after they
suffered severe liquidity crises and were nationalized by the State. It was
considered necessary to wind up IBRC, a decision adopted through the
IBRC Act 2013, which also changed an important part of Ireland’s
corporate liquidation rules. The foreign representatives who sought
recognition were special liquidators appointed under public authority and
were supervised by the Irish Finance Minister and the High Court of
Ireland. US courts recognized the Irish proceedings as main proceedings.
They dismissed the argument about the non-applicability of Chapter 15
to “banks,” tiptoeing over the question as to whether IBRC was a bank
and focusing instead on the fact that it had closed its branches in the US
before the request of recognition.81
Indeed, the above suggests that, while banks may merit some
specialties, there is no prima facie reason to exclude the principles
underpinning cross-border insolvency, such as recognition, creditor
protection, non-discrimination, etc. These may offer interpretative
criteria to clarify cases where resolution rules are silent. Thus, the
question of whether cross-border insolvency rules do apply is related to
the question of whether they should apply, which requires looking
carefully at the differences between cross-border insolvency and crossborder resolution. One of those differences concerns the resolution
authorities entrusted with the procedure, another concerns the nature and
purpose of the procedure itself.
The first objection is not insurmountable. Resolution authorities,
rather than courts,82 may have the preponderant role. However, to be

78

UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. Guide to Enactment para. 58.
Ibid at 59.
80
In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Lt. 2014 WL 9953792, (Bkr. D. Del. 2014),
confirmed on appeal in C.A. No. 14-108-LPS (Dist. Ct. Del.) 4th August 2015.
81
See In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Lt. 2014 WL 9953792, (Bkr. D. Del. 2014) at 7.
82
This objection could argue that the extraterritorial projection of regulatory power has
traditionally been a strong reason to refuse recognition and enforcement. This has been
the reason to refuse recognition and enforcement of tax claims. See Moore v. Mitchell, 30
79
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subject to recognition under UNCITRAL rules, court supervision may be
potential, rather than actual,83 and the UNCITRAL Model Law allows
recognition of proceedings entrusted to administrative authorities.84 The
courts of In re Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd discussed above
rejected the objection against recognition of proceedings directed by the
Irish Finance Ministry, holding that the proceeding was “administrative
or judicial in nature,” that provisions on corporate liquidation applied,
and that any creditor could seek a court ruling on issues arising during
the proceeding.85
Thus, the problem is less about form or subjects than about
substantive differences concerning the distributional question of creditor
treatment, which constitutes the subject-matter of this study. Crossborder insolvency proceedings must be directed at the general
“collective” protection of all creditors,86 respecting minimum conditions
of fairness between them.87 Proceedings to protect specific creditors or

F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929) in the United States, and Planche v. Fletcher, (1779) 99 Eng.
Rep. 164, 165 (U.K.) in Britain.
83
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. Guide to Enactment para. 74.
This argument was used to recognize corporate liquidation proceedings. See Australian
courts in Re Chow Cho Poon construed the law’s scope in a spirit of cooperation to grant
recognition to special winding up proceedings under Singapore corporate law as
proceedings “pursuant to a law relating to insolvency”. See Re Chow Cho Poon (Private
Limited) [2011] NSWSC 300.
84
See article 2 (a), which states that ‘“Foreign proceeding” means a collective judicial or
administrative proceeding in a foreign State’, and (e), which states that ‘“Foreign court”
means a judicial or other authority competent to control or supervise a foreign
proceeding’. The Guide to Enactment at para. 87 states that ‘A foreign proceeding that
meets the requisites of article 2, subparagraph (a), should receive the same treatment
irrespective of whether it has been commenced and supervised by a judicial body or an
administrative body. Therefore, in order to obviate the need to refer to a foreign nonjudicial authority whenever reference is made to a foreign court, the definition of “foreign
court” in subparagraph (e) includes also non-judicial authorities.’ In In re Ashapura
Minechem Ltd, 480 B.R.129 (SDNY 2012), US courts considered the India’s Board for
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) as a ‘court’. In Re ABC Learning Centres
Limited n/k/a ZYX Learning Centres Limited & ABC USA Holdings Pty Ltd. No. 1011711 (KG) (Bankr. Ct. Dist. Del. 16 December 2010) the Delaware courts recognize a
foreign liquidation proceeding in Australia despite it was primarily administrative in
nature, as it was supervised by a court.
85
In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Lt. 2014 WL 9953792, (Bkr. D. Del. 2014),
confirmed on appeal in C.A. No. 14-108-LPS (Dist. Ct. Del.) 4th August 2015.
86
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Perspective p. 20.
87
Simon Gleeson “Chapter 5. The Consequences of Chapter 14 for International
Recognition of US Bank Resolution Action” in Thomas H Jackson; Kenneth Scott; John
Taylor Making Failure Feasible: How Bankruptcy Reform Can End Too Big to Fail
Hoover Institution, Stanford University Press, 2015, p. 119.
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interests, public or private, are not suitable for recognition. In Stanford
International Bank, UK courts refused to recognize proceedings ordered
by a Texas court, which appointed the SEC as receiver. Courts in
Antigua and Barbuda, the place of the bank’s registered office, had
applied and been granted such recognition first. Thus, the English court
considered that (i) the US receiver had to prove and did not try to prove
that the entity’s COMI was in the US; and, more crucially, (ii) the
proceedings were not “pursuant to a law relating to insolvency” because
they were not collective proceedings seeking to protect all creditors but
rather instituted to prevent fraud and detriment to (US) investors.88 It is
easy to draw a parallel with bank resolution, which seeks to avoid
systemic risk and contagion, protect taxpayers and mitigate moral
hazard, or preserve critical functions,89 and conclude that its key
differences with insolvency, at the level of principles, justify the nonapplication of cross-border recognition rules.
Conversely, in re Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd, US courts
dismissed the objection that because the Finance Minister could give
priority to any assets to the Irish State, the Irish Proceeding were not
collective in nature. The courts could reject the argument because the
IBRC Act 2013 adopted the priority and distribution scheme set forth in
the Companies Act and creditors of the same rank distributed proceeds
pro rata.90
Yet all this makes the case against using cross-border insolvency
rules in resolution contexts understandable, not justifiable. The
UNCITRAL framework does not require principles like court
supervision or creditor protection and equal treatment to pervade every
aspect of the applicable framework, but to ensure that certain minimum
standards are respected. Resolution frameworks could and should fulfil
those minimum requirements. Furthermore, the argument about
resolution’s specialness requiring a specific framework makes sense only
if the alternative to cross-border insolvency is an ideal one, which
combines the advantages of a robust framework of recognition with the
specialties of resolution.91 Alas, this is far from the actual alternative.
Doing without cross-border insolvency means having to replace its

88

Re Stanford International Bank Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 137.
See Part I, section II.A.
90
In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Lt. 2014 WL 9953792, (Bkr. D. Del. 2014) at 14.
91
Irit Mevorach “Beyond the Search for Certainty: Addressing the Cross-Border
Resolution Gap” cit. pp. 206-223; Mattias Lehmann “Bail-In and Private International
Law: How to Make Bank Resolution Measures effective across Borders” cit. pp. 139142.
89
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principles, and, in practice, cross-border resolution lacks clear legal
principles which may constrain unilateral action. Some countries
compensate this absence with a non-intrusive bail-in tool, such as the one
currently in place in Japan.92 The United States, by contrast, combines
intrusive bail-in powers with a unilateralist system. UNCITRAL Model
Law provisions can only apply to foreign banks with no branches or
agencies.93 Foreign banks with (federally-chartered) branches or agencies
in the US can be subject to receivership and the receiver can take
possession of all the property of the foreign bank in the US and liquidate
it,94 or they can be subject to reorganization proceedings by the FDIC (if
the branch is deposit-insured) or the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (“OCC”), which can also appoint a conservator.95 The
procedure is unilateralist and territorialist,96 with no duty to coordinate
with foreign proceedings, and no possibility to send any resources abroad
until US creditors are satisfied.97 In order to coordinate, the OCC or
FDIC would need to use their discretion to forbear from appointing a

92

Japan Deposit Insurance Act (DIA), for example, includes a general duty of
cooperation, with no clear meaning, See Article 137-5 of the DIA. There are no specific
rules to solve conflicts of laws, or issues of recognition. Ignacio Tirado “Banking Crisis
and the Japanese Legal Framework” cit. p. 74. The problem is more serious if recognition
is sought for a bail-in decision adopted by a foreign authority in Japan. The opposite case
(where the Japanese authority adopts the bail-in decision) is less problematic, because
bail-in is restricted to the cases where there is contractual recognition. In an earlier
section we justified our attention on the more intrusive regimes, i.e. the US, EU and
Swiss ones. Supra 2.2.2.1.
93
In re awal Bank, 455 B.r. 73 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) and In re Jsc Bta Bank, 434 B.r.
334 (Bankr. s.D.n.y. 2010) chapter 15 cases were allowed for a Bahraini bank and a
Kazakhstani with no branches or agencies in the US.
94
Sections 4 (i) – (j) of the International Banking Act 1978. See Paul Lee “Cross-Border
Resolution of Banking Groups: International Initiatives and US Perspectives: Part III” cit.
pp. 299-302.
95
Ibid p. 300.
96
Steven L. Schwarcz “The Confused U.S. Framework for Foreign-Bank Insolvency: An
Open Research Agenda” Rev. L & Econ. Vol. 1 (2005) pp. 86-89, who uses the term
“xenophobic”.
97
Section 4 (j) (2) International Banking Act. See Paul Lee “Cross-Border Resolution of
Banking Groups: International Initiatives and US Perspectives: Part III” cit. p. 303.
Branches chartered under state law would be subject to that state’s bank bankruptcy law,
which is often equally territorialist. Ibid p. 304, who discusses the case of New York
Banking Law, as a particularly imprtant example of state law, which follows a ringfencing approach.
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receiver in cases where, for example, a credible bail-in plan will be
implemented by foreign resolution authorities.98
For large foreign banks subject to the orderly liquidation authority
(OLA), and thus with a US holding company, the FDIC must coordinate
“to the maximum extent possible” with foreign financial authorities
when the bank has assets or operations in countries other than the United
States.99 Yet the provision is drafted in unilateral terms for cases of a US
entity with assets abroad, not a foreign entity with assets or operations in
the United States. An internationalist could still argue that, even if crossborder insolvency provisions and principles do not apply to resolution,
common law principles of recognition and judicial assistance might still
be used as backup because they are not expressly excluded by crossborder insolvency law.100 Nevertheless, the decision to cooperate will fall
on resolution authorities and will thus have distinct unilateralist roots.
EU rules are also intrusive but have a clearer framework for the
recognition and enforcement of third country proceedings.101 This
includes a procedure to achieve a joint decision by the resolution college
on the recognition of foreign procedures, and, absent such joint decision,
an individual decision by each of the resolution authorities. The
procedure is accompanied by a list of powers that may be exercised in
aid of third-country resolution proceedings, including powers to transfer
shares and other instruments, or assets and liabilities, and to render
unenforceable rights to terminate, liquidate or accelerate contracts.
Still, the rules are completed by a list of circumstances where
recognition may be refused, which include the existence of adverse
effects on the financial stability of the Member State concerned or
another Member State, the need for independent action to achieve some

98

See Paul Lee “Cross-Border Resolution of Banking Groups: International Initiatives
and US Perspectives: Part III” cit. p. 301.
99
12 USC § 5390 (a) (1) (N).
100
Cross-border insolvency provisions only exclude banks from their own application,
but not from the application of common law. Samuel l. Bufford, Tertiary and Other
Excluded Foreign Proceedings Under Bankruptcy Code Chapter 15, 83 am. Bankr. L.J.
165, 177-178, (2009); Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, Overview of Chapter 15 Ancillary and
Other Cross-Border Cases, 82 am. Bankr. L.J. 269, 301 (2008) who argues that comity
could be obtained from courts other than bankruptcy courts. There are pre-UNCITRAL
precedents where US courts allowed ancillary proceedings to begin in their territory for
foreign banks with branches/agencies, post-UNCITRAL cases. See In re Deposit
Insurance agency, 482 f.3d 612 (2d cir. 2007), aff’g, 313 B.r. 561 (s.D.n.y. 2004); In re
smouha, 136 B.r. 921 (s.D.n.y.), appeal dismissed, 979 f.2d 845 (1992).
101
Article 94 BRRD.
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resolution objective, the existence of unequal treatment of creditors in a
Member State under the laws of the third country, the existence of
material fiscal implications for the Member State in case recognition is
granted, or the fact that recognition is contrary to national law.102 These
exceptions pose the greatest danger for cross-border coordination.
Whereas the content of some of them is logical, and a matter of principle
or right (e.g. the unequal treatment of creditors), others are policy-based
and hardly reviewable by courts (e.g. the references to “material fiscal
implications” or “financial stability”). Add to this the potentially
fractious decision-making process within the resolution college,103 and
this is a recipe for trouble. Fortunately, in purely Eurozone cases, the
SRB shall have the preponderant role in assessing whether third-country
resolution proceedings shall be recognized but bearing in mind the
interest of participating states.104
Swiss rules, which contemplate resolution powers that could be
potentially troublesome for creditors,105 are similarly complete and
expressly (i) contemplate a universality principle when proceedings are
open in Switzerland;106 (ii) provide for the recognition of foreign
resolution action, even in the absence of reciprocity;107 and (iii) provide
for the possibility to put assets located in Switzerland at the disposal of
the foreign insolvency estate, subject to the respect of certain creditors
rights.108 However, once again, the rules are drafted in discretionary
terms, with no legally enforceable duty.
The degree of discretion and the unilateralist approach in these
frameworks may be somewhat tempered through international treaties or
agreements between resolution authorities. EU rules on the recognition
of foreign resolution proceedings, for example, only apply “unless and

102

Article 95 BRRD. These roughly correspond to the grounds identified by the FSB.
See FSB Cross-border recognition of resolution action cit. p. 9.
103
Infra 4.3.
104
Article 33 (2) para. 3rd Regulation 806/2014 (SRMR) states that: “The assessment
shall give due consideration to the interests of each individual participating Member State
where a third- country institution or parent undertaking operates, and in particular to the
potential impact of the recognition and enforcement of the third-country resolution
proceedings on the other parts of the group and the financial stability in those Member
States”.
105
Supra 2.2.2.1.
106
Article 3 BIO-FINMA.
107
Article 10 BIO-FINMA. Recognition requests absent reciprocity may be granted
“where this is in the interests of the creditors affected”.
108
Article 37g (2) Swiss Banking Act.
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until an international agreement as referred to in Article 93(1) enters into
force with the relevant third country.”109 Yet no international treaties
have been subscribed, and thus most international cooperation
(coordination) is restricted to agreements between competent resolution
authorities, which result in crisis-management groups (CMGs) “with the
objective of enhancing preparedness for, and facilitating the management
and resolution of, a cross-border financial crisis affecting the firm,” as
well as institution-specific Cooperation Agreements (CoAGs).110 Even if
CMGs have been established for all SIFIs and many CoAGs have been
signed,111 the focus of such agreements is primarily cooperation in
information exchange and planning, which means that there is no clear
pre-commitment to recognize and enforce resolution tools. Furthermore,
those agreements are not legally binding for authorities.112
Interinstitutional cooperation agreements are supplemented by
private sector contractual solutions. The ISDA Protocol for the Stay of
Derivatives enforcement113 and the solutions for contractual bail-in
instruments are perhaps the most notable. We will analyse them in
greater detail below.114 Suffice it to say here, however, that the
enforcement of these solutions depends on the domestic legal
frameworks, where resolution authorities have broad powers to paralyze
such enforcement action.
The effort to put in a creating cross-border resolution framework has
been formidable. Yet one wonders why it did not include the easiest
measure, i.e. to use cross-border insolvency frameworks as background
principles, which would let resolution arrangements prevail as lex
specialis but still help to fill gaps. The current all-or-nothing stake on a
fuzzy framework of non-binding agreements, private sector contracting,
and unilateral goodwill jeopardises the whole system and subverts
resolution’s basic premises. It makes sense to reflect resolution’s
specialness in a cross-border context; but casting aside cross-border
insolvency without alternative principles to replace it results in a looselyknit framework where authorities have a strong incentive to protect
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Article 94 (1) BRRD.
FSB Key Attributes no. 8.1 and 9.
111
FSB Ten years on – taking stock of post-crisis resolution reforms Sixth Report on the
Implementation of Resolution Reforms 6 July 2017 p. 12.
112
See, e.g. Framework Cooperation Arrangement between the European Banking
Authority (‘EBA’) and US authorities, no. 2.5, 3.1.
113
ISDA
2015
Resolution
Stay
Protocol.
Available
at
http://assets.isda.org/media/ac6b533f-3/5a7c32f8-pdf/.
114
Infra 5.2.3.
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national interest and domestic creditors yet are subject to few constraints.
This recklessly jeopardises the swift action and seamless coordination
needed to mitigate systemic risk and contagion, and it does not help
prevent moral hazard or enhance legal certainty.
The failings of the system are likely to be exposed more clearly
when the problem concerns the distributional question of ranking and
priorities. Even in cross-border insolvency, where principles are robust,
the distributional question is a test case that touches on core policies.115
There are not two ranking and priority systems that are exactly alike,116
which can make a “borderline” issue, where the problem lies in the
application of a rule, look like a “pivotal” issue, which involves the
system’s basic policies and principles hindering cross-border
cooperation.117 Thus, the UNCITRAL provisions on foreign creditors
treatment are particularly nuanced to balance the demands of nondiscrimination with the need to respect the domestic system of
priorities.118
Some cases are often cited to show that courts are capable of looking
beyond national interests. In HIH Casualty and General Insurance,119 an
insurer declared insolvent in Australia had substantial assets in the UK
(reinsurance claims corresponding to reinsurance policies taken out in
the London market). English courts, including the House of Lords,
ordered the transfer of those assets to satisfy insolvency priorities under

115

José María Garrido ‘The Distributional Question in Insolvency: Comparative Aspects’
International Insolvency Review Vol. 4 (1995) p. 25.
116
Jose María Garrido ‘No Two Snowflakes the Same: The Distributional Question in
International Bankruptcies’ Texas International Law Journal Vol. 46 (2011) p. 459.
117
This situation is well summarized by Westbrook: From a broad policy perspective,
the differences are not crucial, yet each one represents a contentious result in a
particular case because one party or another will be advantaged or disadvantaged.
Meaningful cooperation among courts will often require that one or the other priority
system prevails. The question is whether a court will feel so bound by the local system so
as to prevent cooperation with a foreign court. Jay Lawrence Westbrook ‘Priority
Conflicts as a Barrier to Cooperation in Multinational Insolvencies’ Penn State
International Law Review Vol. 27 (2009) p. 869.
118
Article 13 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that (i) foreign creditors should
not be treated worse than local creditors; (ii) this non-discrimination should not affect the
local system of priorities; and (iii) this notwithstanding, the application of such system
should not lead to foreign creditors ranking lower than ordinary local creditors. Lest the
non-discrimination principle should be emptied of its meaning by provisions giving the
lowest ranking to foreign claims, paragraph 2 establishes the minimum ranking for claims
of foreign creditors: the rank of general unsecured claims.” Guide to Enactment and
Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, para. 119.
119
HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd, [2008] UKHL 21.
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Australian law, which, unlike UK law, accorded preferential treatment to
insurance creditors.120 But aside from Lord Hoffman’s universalist chant,
there were other factors at play that made it convenient for UK courts to
do without assets located in their territory.121 In normal circumstances,
local authorities would apply their local priority system and lack tools to
grant foreign creditors preferential status, other than local law categories.
Nevertheless, courts in one country would be ready to grant recognition
to resolution action if creditors were treated fairly. As the court in In re
Irish bank made clear, the key is whether creditors are subject to the
foreign country’s system of ranking and priorities and whether creditor
treatment is roughly similar to the local system.122 A public policy
exception is reserved for serious deviations that leave key interests
unprotected.123
In resolution rules, on the other hand, there is paucity of detail on the
level of deference to third countries when the distributional issue is
raised. EU resolution rules exclude some liabilities from bail-in
regardless of whether they are subject to the laws of a Member State or

120

Ibid at [1], [35], the differences that resulted from the application of either the UK
system of priorities or the Australian one were listed in a table in [53].
121
Namely, (i) Australia was one of the jurisdictions included by the Secretary of State
among those qualified to receive special assistance; (ii) due to the implementation of EU
insurance rules, Britain was about to enact an insurance creditors’ priority similar to the
Australian, which made the divergence temporary, and thus, arguably, not a matter of
policy; (iii) protection of foreign creditors enhanced London’s pre-eminence as an
insurance centre; and (iv) the conflict in the case was between foreign priorities and the
local pari passu principle (protective of unsecured creditors), which, in a taxonomy of
priority conflicts, would be of a less intense kind than that between foreign and local
priorities. See Jose María Garrido ‘No Two Snowflakes the Same: The Distributional
Question in International Bankruptcies’ op. cit. pp. 463-465. See also Jay Lawrence
Westbrook ‘Universal Priorities’ Texas International Law Journal Vol. 33 (1998) pp. 3032, 40; Sefa Franken ‘Three Principles of Transnational Corporate Bankruptcy Law: A
Review’ European Law Journal Vol. 11 (2005) p. 239.
122
‘Appellants suggest (largely through a series of questions, see D.I. 34 at 1 18) that the
Irish Proceeding discriminates against U.S. creditors and deprives them of due process
and other unspecified constitutional rights, in favor of benefitting the Irish government.
As Appellees persuasively respond, the provisions objected to by Appellants parallel
provisions in laws adopted by the United States in response to the global financial crisis.’
In re Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Lt. C.A. No. 14-108-LPS (Dist. Ct. Del.) 4th August
2015 (appeal decision).
123
In Re Qimonda AG Bankr. Lit. 09-14766-RGM; 09-14766-SSM 433 B.R. 547; 462
B.R. 165 Bankr. E Dist. Vir. (2011), US courts considered that the German procedure
insufficiently protected the rights of the licensee under an IP licensing contract (US
provisions would grant the licensee a choice, whilst the foreign representative indicated
its intention not to perform the contracts).
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of a third country,124 even if they would have to fit within the categories
envisaged by EU law. The laws of Switzerland could be construed in a
similar manner, considering the liberal approach they adopt towards
third-country proceedings and the absence of discriminatory provisions
regarding the rights of preferential creditors.125
US law contains no express reference to the laws of third countries,
but the ranking stipulated for unsecured creditors126 should not be
interpreted as being restricted to instruments subject to US law. The only
exception would be government claims, where the rules that rank them as
second in priority only to administration expenses expressly refer to
“amounts owed to the United States,” thus excluding liabilities owed to
other governments. Liabilities of foreign creditors would need to fit
within the categories envisaged by US law (e.g. administration expenses,
employee rights, or post-resolution financing),127 but should enjoy the
same ranking. The outcome is difficult to envisage because resolution
authorities have discretion to benefit specific classes of creditors128 but
they may be constrained by allegations of discrimination by US
creditors.
This takes us back to the policy drawing room.129 Unilateral
approaches lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium of liquidity supply, and this
conclusion should not change much if liquidity does not come from bailouts, but from bail-ins: lack of trust between local authorities of different
jurisdictions leads to uncoordinated unilateral action that constrains
liquidity and increases instability. In terms of the “trilemma” between
global financial stability, global banks, and domestic authorities,130 the
latter have not been sacrificed, but strengthened. This, in principle,
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Covered deposits, secured liabilities, liabilities arising from holding of clients assets
or money or fiduciary relationships, liabilities under 7 days, liabilities from accrued
salary, pension benefits or other fixed remuneration, commercial or trade creditors, or tax
or social security authorities would be covered regardless of the law governing the
relationship. See article 44 (2) BRRD.
125
Article 37 Banking Act, articles 3, 10, 35, 47 BIO-FINMA.
126
12 USC §§ 5386 (3), 5390 (a) (1) (M), and 5390 (b).
127
12 USC § 5390 (b) (1) (A), (C), (D) or (2).
128
12 USC § 5390 (b) (4).
129
See section II.A.
130
Dirk Shoenmaker “The financial trilemma” Economic Letters 111 (2011) pp. 57-59;
Stijn Claessens; Richard J. Herring; Dirk Shoenmaker; Kimberly A. Summe “A Safer
World Financial System: Improving the Resolution of Systemic Institutions” Geneva
Reports on the World Economy 12 (2010) p. 32.
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comes at the expense of global financial stability. In section IV we will
explore how this is mitigated by sacrificing global banks.131

III.

CROSS-BORDER RESOLUTION AND KEY OPERATIONAL
LIABILITIES

Having seen how the general framework of cross-border resolution is
mired in uncertainty, we proceed now to analyse how this affects
specifically the different types of bank liabilities used in previous
sections. We discuss deposits (A) arrangements for liquidity and
collateral, and hedging and derivatives (B), and subordinated and nonpreferred debt (C).

A. Deposits: Cross-border resolution, local preferences, and
the risks of parochialism
In the first part of this study, we illustrated how resolution
frameworks have been specifically tailored to protect depositors.132 The
goal is to ensure that the financial backstop does not turn into a bank
subsidy. In a domestic setting, this logic works impeccably since
financial backstops and resolution authorities belong to the same
jurisdiction and their interests are aligned. Indeed, the same authority that
manages the resolution fund may also be the resolution authority, as is
the case with the FDIC in the US.133 In cross-border cases, however,
foreign branch deposits may not be covered by the domestic deposit
guarantee scheme. Granting them the same protection in insolvency or
resolution could be seen as an implied subsidy to the foreign deposit
guarantee scheme and/or encourage supervisory laxity by host
authorities. These tensions can result in (i) conceptual problems around
what constitutes a protected deposit, and (ii) policy problems relating to
the status that should be granted to domestic deposits vis-à-vis foreign
deposits.
Conceptual problems can arise even in cases where the insolvencyresolution protection is not disputed. In the Aresbank case, decided by
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Infra 5.3.
See Part I, section III.A.1.
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12 U.S.C. 1811(a) and (b).
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the EFTA court,134 Aresbank, a Spanish bank, granted a loan to
Landsbanski, an Icelandic bank, which did not enter the debt as a deposit
in its books, nor were the funds placed, nor were special documents
regarding the receipt of funds issued, nor were premiums paid to the
Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund in respect to the funds.135
After the meltdown of the Icelandic banking system, the Icelandic
financial supervisory authority (FME) took over the functions of
Landsbanski’s board and set up a bridge institution which, according to
the FME, should take over obligations “of the branches of Landsbanki in
Iceland due to deposits from financial undertakings, the Icelandic
Central Bank and other customers.” The EFTA Court held that despite
the peculiar circumstances in which the Aresbank loan was originated,
and despite the fact that, as an inter-bank deposit, it was not eligible for
repayment under the deposit guarantee scheme, it was still transferred to
the bridge institution under the FME decision.
Since the case was based on an interpretation of a specific decision
of the financial authority rather than a set of legal rules it is unclear
whether its conclusions have any precedential value. Interbank deposits
are not excluded from bail-in, but short-term funding is, at least in the
EU.136 Thus, if a short-term liquidity facility is concluded between a
bank soon to be in resolution and a creditor, e.g. another bank, the latter
only needs to structure it as a loan rather than a deposit to be redeemed in
the short-term. More problematic, however, could be the case of
countries like Italy, which exclude all deposits, including corporate and
interbank deposits, from bail-in.137
The policy problems concern the treatment of domestic deposits visà-vis foreign deposits, which can have regional (e.g. intra-EU) or fully
international dimension. In an intra-EU context, the difficulty can arise
from the expanded privilege granted to deposits in countries such as
Italy, which include large corporate deposits, or inter-bank deposits.138
This could create difficulties in cases where two entities that are located
in different EU countries (e.g. Italy and Spain), which have a liquidity
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Case E-17/11 Aresbank SA and Landsbankinn hf., Fjármálaeftirlitið (the Financial
Supervisory Authority) and the Icelandic State 22 November 2012.
135
Ibid at 47.
136
Article 44 (2) (a) BRRD.
137
See Part I, section IV.A.2.
138
These preferences were established to comply with rules on Minimum Requirements
on Eligible Liabilities (MREL) without having to issue new debt. See Part I, section
IV.A.
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arrangement involving deposits on each other, are put into resolution and
Italian authorities are asked to enforce the bail-in of the deposits held by
the Italian entity in the Spanish one, while the deposits by the Spanish
entity in the Italian one are excluded from bail-in. The case may be
worse when deposits are one of the tools that several related entities (in a
group or not) use for liquidity management purposes. In that case, having
recourse to the ad hoc exclusion under article 44(3) of the BRRD may
not be justified because it is reserved for “exceptional” cases, and yet the
bail-in of such deposits may still be extremely disruptive.
In a fully international context, some jurisdictions have introduced
domestic deposit preference regimes. A notable case is the US, where the
deposit preference was introduced in 1993139 but the definition of
“deposit” left out foreign deposits, something that was confirmed by
FDIC interpretations.140, 141 The EU framework is less drastic but it also
shows a clear difference in treatment. BRRD rules formulate an
insolvency preference for foreign retail deposits, i.e. deposits that would
be “eligible deposits” for full protection purposes were they not made
through foreign branches, which will rank above ordinary creditors.142
However, these will still rank below domestic retail deposits which are
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Section 11(d)(11)(A) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”), at 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(11)(A). It was introduced by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1993
(OBRA93). See James B. Thomson “The National Depositor Preference Law” Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland (February 15, 1994).
140
Christopher Curtis “The Status of Foreign Deposits under the Federal DepositorPreference Law” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law Vol. 21 (2000)
p. 237. See also James A. Marino; Rosalind Bennett “The Consequences of National
Depositor Preference” FDIC Banking Review (1999) p. 19.
141
The financial crisis stirred controversy over its impact. The UK FCA issued a
consultation paper stating that foreign firms should be prohibited from accepting deposits
through their UK branch, the only options being (i) setting up a subsidiary, (ii) the
elimination of domestic priorities, or (iii) making deposits payable both in host and home
jurisdictions. See Financial Services Authority (FSA) Addressing the implications of nonEEA national depositor preference regimes Consultation Paper CP 12/23 (September
2012).141 The reaction by some firms was to structure deposits to ensure that they were
payable in both jurisdictions. See, e.g. David Polk “FDIC Proposal on Foreign Branch
Deposits: Dual Payability, Depositor Preference and Deposit Insurance”. Client
Memorandum (February 15, 2013); Shearman & Sterling “Preferring Foreign
Depositors” Client Alert (April 10, 2013). 141 To this, the FDIC reacted by explicitly
excluding from deposit preference dually payable deposits from foreign branches. FDIC
“Deposit Insurance Regulations; Definition of Insured Deposit. Final Rule” 12 C.F.R.
Part 330.141
142
See Article 108 (a) (ii) BRRD. The treatment is the same for the amounts exceeding
the coverage level.
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“covered deposits”, and the subrogation claims of Deposit Guarantee
Schemes (DGS).143
Domestic deposit preference regimes are a clear example of how the
logic of resolution policies can be turned on its head when goals and
means are not fully aligned. It makes sense to have resolution rules to
mitigate contagion and systemic risk. Protecting deposits enhances trust
in the system. However, when rules designed to achieve those ends are
administered in a global system by local authorities, these will minimize
the cost for the latter (and local taxpayers) in a way that may undermine
trust and instability, thereby achieving the opposite goal. This is a clear
application of the international “trilemma” logic outlined above,144 with
surprising and harmful results.
The policy flaws may be clear, but the implications for a principlesbased interpretation are less so. The different treatment of domestic
branch and foreign branch deposits may be justified when it comes to the
right to reimbursement, which is a right against the DGS, and it is based
on the contributions made for those deposits to that same DGS. When the
difference is used to determine deposit preferences, however, it means
that the exact same kind of right (arising from a deposit) against the
exact same entity (branches lack legal personality) is discriminated
against without a clear justification. Transparency rules try to ensure the
client’s awareness of the applicable coverage,145 but such rules are far
from perfect146 and do not eliminate the pervasive question of which of
the system’s policies are being furthered by the difference in treatment.
The discrimination can hardly mitigate moral hazard, bolster financial
stability or preserve critical functions, and it undermines trust in
international banking, which is hardly a resolution policy. If anything, it
might reduce taxpayer exposure, but only if deposits were reimbursed
with public money, which is not typically the case. If cost-saving is the
underpinning logic, the same could be achieved if blue-eyed or male
143

See Article 108 (b) BRRD. For a detailed analysis of the treatment of different types
of deposits under the BRRD, see Part I, section III.A.1.
144
See section II.A.
145
Article 16 DGS Directive. The template for such information is set out in Annex I of
the Directive, and the depositors shall acknowledge the receipt of that information before
entering contract of deposit. See article 16 (2) DGS Directive.
146
In the EU, the rules only require disclosure of the information of the DGS of which
the institution and its branches are members within the Union. Article 16 (1) DGS
Directive. Furthermore, there is no comparable duty of disclosure of the information on
the deposit’s ranking in case the EU bank were to be subject to insolvency proceedings,
or resolution and bail-in. This leaves the depositor unprotected and unaware of such lack
of protection.
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depositors were singled out for discrimination. The difference is that in
such case the arbitrariness of the measure would become plainer.147

B. Liquidity (Cash and Collateral) and Hedging
Arrangements: Characterizing the Uncharacterizable
Collateral arrangements are key to ensure a bank’s liquidity
management. In order to ensure that liquidity management runs
smoothly, there needs to be certainty in the execution of the different
collateral arrangements underpinning these transactions. Yet, for
purposes of validity, enforcement, and recognition, security interests are
subject to the laws of the place where the assets are located (lex rei
sitae), the laws of the place of the grantor of the security right,148 or the
laws of the place of the register for non-possessory security rights over
receivables.149
In cases of “financial collateral arrangements,”150 the rules are more
specific and rely on the law chosen by the intermediary and the securities
holder in the US151 or the law of the place of the relevant securities
account (PRIMA approach) in the EU.152 This offers a more certain set of
possibilities, but it can create difficulties in some situations. The first
difficulty is posed when financial collateral arrangements are subject to a
single “master agreement” but the securities collateral are deposited in
several jurisdictions. The second arises when, in the case of cross-border
custody chains,153 a client may have a securities account with a bank as

147

For a detailed analysis of the potential of fundamental rights, including the principle
of non-discrimination, as a limit to bail-in, see Ramos, D. and Solana, J., “Fundamental
rights: A Limit to bail-in?” (forthcoming 2019).
148
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions pp. 384 et seq.
149
Sections 860 and 869 of the UK Companies Act 2006 (charges and Companies
House). See also, e.g. article 1 (4) Italian Decree Law n. 59 of 2016, or articles 67 et seq.
of the Spanish Act on Mortgage over Movables and Non-Possessory Pledge.
150
The term “financial collateral arrangements” defines the scope of application of the
Financial Collateral Directive (FCD) in the EU. For a detailed definition, see article 2
FCD.
151
Sections §§ 8-110 (b) and (e), and 9-305 (a) (3) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
See also article 4 (1) of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rigths
in respect of Securities held with an Intermediary.
152
Article 9 (1) FCD. Sections §§ 8-110 (b) and (e), and 9-305 (a) (3) of the Uniform
Commercial Code also refer to the “securities’ intermediary jurisdiction”, but let the
parties determine this through their agreement, which de facto makes
153
See, e.g. ESMA Call for Evidence. Asset segregation and custody services 15 July
2016 | ESMA/2016/1137, and the response by ECSDA CSDs, asset segregation, and
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custodian 1, but that bank may hold both its proprietary securities and its
clients’ securities with custodian 2, which is established in another
jurisdiction. The situation can be extremely complex if custodian 2 fails
and securities are commingled.
This is compounded by the fact that some bespoke collateral
arrangements may be difficult to classify and characterize in terms of
existing security arrangements. This can create problems if the security
interest is “floating”154 over all present and future assets. In the Lehman
(Extended Liens) case, the problem was how to classify a clause in the
liquidity management arrangement.155 This was a boilerplate clause used
in custody agreements with Lehman customers, but used for intra-group
liquidity management purposes: one group entity agreed to grant another
group entity as “custodian” a “general lien on all property held by it”
under the agreement.156 Justice Briggs noted that, under English law, a
“lien” is a possessory security and therefore cannot fall over intangible
assets. He concluded that, since the arrangement granted the “client”
(group entity) control over the funds, it was a floating charge subject to
registration which had not been dully registered. Lastly, Briggs examined
whether the “lien” could be characterized as a “financial collateral
arrangement” protected by the 2002 Financial Collateral Directive
(FCD),157 which he rejected on the basis that the collateral taker (charge)
did not have ‘possession or control’ over the collateral assets, as required
by the FCD.158
Let us now consider this situation on a cross-border basis. An
“omnibus” account that relies on some kind of “floating” security interest
may be subject to the laws of countries that contemplate this kind of
security interest (e.g. UK or Sweden) but may rely on collateral
deposited in countries that do not contemplate it (e.g. Spain) or where its
status is not clear (e.g. Italy).159 Authorities would have to decide, first, if
the security is a “financial collateral arrangement” subject to specific

custody services under UCITS and AIFMD, 23 September 2016. See also Diana Chan;
Florence Fontan; Simonetta Rosati; Daniela Russo “The Securities Custody Industry”
ECB Occassional Paper Series No. 68 (August 2007).
154
For a discussion of the treatment of collateral arrangements, and especially floating
securities, see Part I, section III.A.2.
155
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) ([2012] EWHC 2997
(Ch)).
156
Supra 3.1.2 for the text of the clause.
157
Directive 2002/47/EC, of 6 June 2002, on Financial Collateral Arrangements.
158
For a more detailed discussion, see Part I, section III.A.2.
159
For a detailed analysis, see Part I, section III.A.2.
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rules such as the FCD, and they might differ in their appraisal of the
“possession or control” requirement, some considering the arrangement
to be subject to FCD rules, others not. In cases falling outside FCD rules,
authorities would have to consider the validity and enforceability of
rights under the lex rei sitae, for example, which could result in different
conclusions depending on the assets’ “location”: an uncertain status
under Spanish or German law, a less preferential insolvency treatment in
the UK, and a priority over 55% of the insolvent firm’s assets in
Sweden.160 Yet, the bail-in tool can only have a binary effect on the
secured liabilities: either they are “in” or “out” of bail-in. In a crossborder context, it would be impossible to give such a definitive answer.
These difficulties will also affect secured liabilities arising from
derivatives, whose treatment in insolvency law also differs among
Member States.161 Resolution authorities will rely on the law of the home
Member State of the institution,162 which can create problems if it
allocates losses to creditors under derivatives contracts governed by the
law of a different country or residing in another country. Within the EU,
the rules guarantee recognition and the risk of a discrimination claim
looks remote, but a truly differentiated treatment could give the affected
creditors a right to challenge the actions adopted.163
Outside such an integrated framework, and absent cooperation
agreements with third-country resolution authorities,164 resolution
authorities of EU Member States could reject the recognition of third-
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For a detailed analysis, see Part I, section III.A.2.
For a discussion of the treatment of derivatives, see Part I, section III.A.3.
162
See BRRD, art 48(1)(e); Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, art
10(2)(h).
163
See BRRD, arts. 85 and 66(6)(b). A differentiated treatment would still be subject to
the limit of non-discrimination. See e.g. European Convention of Human Rights, art 14;
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art 21. Paragraph 13 of the
Preamble ot the BRRD expressly recognises the need of resolution actions to be
compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. It adds: ‘In particular,
where creditors within the same class are treated differently in the context of resolution
action, such distinctions should be justified in the public interest and proportionate to the
risks being addressed and should be neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory on the
grounds of nationality.’ See also paragraphs 29 and 47 of the Preamble to the BRRD.
Derivatives counterparties could challenge the resolution proceeding initiated in country
A by challenging the validity of the creditor ranking under the law of country A. See
BRRD, arts 85(2) and (3). For a detailed analysis of how anti-discrimination claims may
constitute a limit to the effective application of bail-in, see Ramos and Solana,
“Fundamental rights: A limit to bail-in? (forthcoming 2019).
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See BRRD, arts 93(1) and (2), 97(3)(e).
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country resolution proceedings on several grounds: if the treatment of
derivative contracts were to threaten the financial stability of any
Member State; if it were to have material fiscal implications for that
Member State; if its effects were contrary to the national law; or if
creditors “would not receive the same treatment” as third-country
creditors and depositors.165 The risk would be the same if EU resolution
authorities sought recognition of their bail-in measures over derivatives
claims in third countries.
Rather than harmonising creditor priorities, the laws should eliminate
disparities in treatment based on nationality or residence for creditors
under the same type of instrument. Yet the FSB merely recommends
transparency about the priority rankings for different creditors. The
paucity of details of domestic and regional systems have prompted
private sector solutions. These, however, have focused on securing a stay
of enforcement of derivatives contracts through the ISDA protocol to its
Master Agreement,166 which has been adhered to by most dealer
banks,167 and cannot guarantee that the rights arising from those contracts
will be treated equally.

C. Subordinated and Non-preferred Debt: The Relationship
Between Different Debt Types
To mitigate the frictions between resolution and insolvency
priorities, regulatory rules require banks to have an adequate cushion of
debt that is easy to bail-in in order to ensure its loss-absorbency capacity
(TLAC).168 In a cross-border context, however, this will only work if a
bail-in decision by a resolution authority is enforced by another
resolution authority. This depends on the cross-border recognition of
resolution action, which, save for regional cases, like the EU, is quite
uncertain.169
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BRRD, arts 94(3), second sub-paragraph, 95(a) (financial stability), 95(d) (material
fiscal implications), art 95(e) (effects contrary to the law) and art 95(c) (unequal
treatment).
166
ISDA
2015
Resolution
Stay
Protocol.
Available
at
http://assets.isda.org/media/ac6b533f-3/5a7c32f8-pdf/
167
See the adhering parties at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocolmanagement/protocol/22
168
We explore these functions and the rationale for TLAC in greater detail in Part I,
section 4.A.
169
See section II.
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In light of such uncertainty, the FSB has pressed for private sector
solutions consisting in model clauses that, once included in debenture
agreements, will provide a contractual basis for the recognition of bail-in
in countries whose laws regulate the debenture agreement.170 The FSB
has stressed some contents that the clauses should have, including the
following:171 (i) a clear agreement by the debt holder to be bound by the
terms of the bail-in under the relevant resolution; (ii) a clear disclosure of
the bail-in term to the debtholders in the relevant jurisdictions; (iii) the
use of general terms, to ensure that the clause merely recognizes bail-in,
but that bail-in itself results from the resolution authority’s decision, in
the terms dictated by that resolution authority, not from contract terms;172
and (iv) the requirement of a legal opinion by experts in the jurisdiction
concerned stating that the clause should result in the enforceability of
bail-in action in that jurisdiction.
The BRRD is aligned with this approach, and requires bank entities
to prove that the debt can be bailed-in under the laws of the country to
which the instruments are subject to “having regard to the terms of the
contract governing the liability, international agreements on the
recognition of resolution proceedings and other relevant matters.”173 The
rules also require banks [insert a verb here] a legal opinion about the
effectiveness and legal enforceability of the clause.174 In line with the
FSB proposals, the European Banking Authority (EBA) developed
specific technical standards for the contractual recognition of bail-in,
such as the contents that a clause should have.175
Different model clauses are offered to their subscribers by industry
associations such as the International Capital Markets Association

170

FSB Cross-border recognition of resolution action cit. p.13.
FSB Cross-border recognition of resolution action cit. p. 14.
172
Thus, if write-down or conversion of the debt is envisaged in other circumstances,
such as a downgrading or default, the clause should make clear that this instance is
completely separate from the one where bail-in powers are exercised
173
Article 55 BRRD.
174
Article 55 (1) 3rd para. BRRD.
175
EBA Final Report. Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on the contractual
recognition of write-down and conversion powers under Article 55(3) of Directive
2014/59/EU EBA/RTS/2015/06 03 July 2015 (hereafter: EBA RTS Contractual Bail-in).
The minimum content of contractual bail-in clauses includes a description of the
resolution powers of the relevant resolution authority; and an acceptance that the liability
may be subject to bail-in, that the holder will be bound by the effect of resolution powers;
and that the contract term is exhaustive on the matters described, to the exclusion of other
agreements, arrangements or understandings. Article 3 EBA RTS Contractual Bail-in.
171
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(ICMA),176 the Loan Market Association (LMA) or the Loan
Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA).177 The only one that is
publicly available was drafted by the Association for Financial Markets
in Europe (AFME), which is conceived for issuers of debt securities
organized in the UK in debt securities offerings governed by New York
law,178 although AFME is working in other versions for different
circumstances. The absence of public availability of some such clauses,
however, can hinder public awareness.
Transparency and clarity of interpretation fostered by uniformity are
key to success. Problems may arise not only from a flat refusal by
authorities or courts to enforce bail-in. Recognition of bail-in is only the
first step. A second problem, once bail-in is recognized, is what status
should the different kinds of subordinated or non-preferred debt enjoy
with respect to each other. We illustrate this with three examples.
A first situation may concern the “equivalence” between different
types of debt. French provisions on Tier 3 debt apply not only to
instruments issued under French law but also under the laws of a
different EU Member State provided they present “analogous
characteristics” to the instruments described under those provisions.179
The question is whether an ordinary bond subject to German law, where
subordination is required by statute, presents “analogous characteristics”
to a French Tier 3 bond, where subordination results from a combination
of the law, on one hand, and the bonds’ terms and conditions, on the
other. The case may be even less clear with a bond subject to Spanish
law, for example, that includes a subordination clause; but only because
Spanish statutory rules use subordination to fulfil a similar function to
“non-preferred” debt in other jurisdictions.
A second situation may arise if debt that is non-preferred, or
subordinated as a matter of contract, competes with debt that is
subordinated as a matter of statute; for example, if Tier-3 or subordinated
debt sits alongside ordinary bonds issued by a German bank, which are
subordinated by bank insolvency law,180 or alongside debt issued by a
Spanish bank and held by a related party, which is subordination by

176

ICMA included bail-in terms in its Agreement Among Managers that forms part of
the ICMA Primary Markets Handbook. See http://www.icmagroup.org/RegulatoryPolicy-and-Market-Practice/Primary-Markets/ipma-handbook-home/
177
http://www.lma.eu.com/documents-guidelines/documents/category/bailin-clause#
178
http://www.afme.eu/Documents/Standard-forms-and-documents.aspx.
179
Article L-613-30-3 4º (b) and (c) French Monetary and Financial Code. We describe
Tier 3 debt in greater detail in Part I, section IV.A.2.
180
See Part I, section IV.A.2.
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general insolvency law.181 Statutory provisions could support the
subordination of contractually subordinated debt to ordinary senior debt
under German law, but the status of Tier-3 debt vis-à-vis ordinary debt in
German law, or of contractually subordinated debt vis-à-vis statutorily
subordinated intra-group debt in Spanish law, would be unclear.
A third situation may arise when there is no clear framework for
equivalence, as is the case between the US and the EU. What status nonpreferred or subordinated bonds, subject, respectively, to French law and
New York law, would enjoy with respect to each other is unclear. In that
case, the presumably boilerplate clauses would be subject to
interpretation by the courts. It is unclear what courts would make of
multiple “non-preferred” and “subordination” clauses. Precedents show
that even the meaning of well-established clauses can be reassessed, as it
happened in NML v Argentina, with a pari passu clause in a sovereign
debt offering.182 Sovereign debt differs from bail-in-able bank debt, but it

181

See Part I, section III.B.1.
The Argentinian government had issued sovereign bonds subject to a Fiscal Agency
Agreement (FAA) that contained a pari passu clause with broad language. It read: “The
Securities will constitute […] direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated
obligations of the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu and without any
preference among themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic under the
Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other present and future
unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness”. Fiscal Agency Agreement
between the Republic of Argentina and Bankers Trust Company, Oct. 19, 1994, quoted in
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012). NML, a vulture fund,
acquired bonds in the secondary market at a discount. After its default in 2001 Argentina
issued a moratorium on payments of all bonds, including FAA bonds, and, in 2005 and
2010, as part of its debt restructuring efforts, it offered bondholders to exchange their
bonds for new, unsecured, unsubordinated, debt, which included a discount (i.e. the new
bonds had a lower value than the older bonds). Yet, Argentina relied more on ‘sticks’
than ‘carrots’, as it included in the prospectus of the new bonds its intention to
discontinue payments of the older bonds, including FAA bonds. To make good on this
promise, it passed Law 26.017 (“Lock Laws”) which included a prohibition to the
Argentinian State “from conducting any type of in-court, outof-court or private settlement
with respect to the bonds.” Afterwards, it discontinued payment of the older bonds. NML
sued Argentina before NY courts for having defaulted on its bonds. See NML Capital,
Ltd. v. Argentina, No. 08 Civ 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012) (decision granting
preliminary injunction); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 264 (2d Cir.
2012) (decision on appeal confirming Judge Griesa’s opinion, but remanding the case to
clarify the meaning of ‘ratable payment’); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, No. 08 Civ
6978 (TPG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167272 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012) (decision holding
that ‘ratable payment’ meant that, if Argentina paid 100% of the Exchange Bonds, that it
had issued in exchange for the older bonds in a debt restructuring not accepted by NML,
it would have to pay 100% to NML for their bonds); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013) (decision by the Court of Appeals affirming
182
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offers useful lessons. One is that courts can adopt controversial
interpretations.183 The other is that, even if courts adopt a conventional
stance, the criteria used to interpret contract language that is boilerplate
in nature are unclear, which means that any interpretation will have a
sizeable impact on market efficiency and stability.184 If such “public”
considerations form part of the assessment, there is no guarantee that
they will make the courts lean towards an “internationalist” stance.
Courts or authorities in the United States could read a decision by French
resolution authorities prioritizing Tier-3 debt subject to French law over
subordinated debt instruments subject to US law as an attempt to
“import” the French system of insolvency priorities into the US
jurisdiction, and therefore refuse enforcement.

IV. THE INTRA-GROUP DIMENSION IN A CROSS-BORDER CONTEXT
In this section, we bring together the perspectives adopted at each
layer: the intra-group dimension, the crisis-prevention and crisismanagement dichotomy, and the cross-border dimension. First, we

Judge Griesa’s holding). See Natalie Wong ‘NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina
and the Changing Roles of the Pari Passu and Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign
Debt Agreements’ Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 53 (2015) p. 396;
Romain Zamour, ‘NML v. Argentina and the Ratable Payment Interpretation of the Pari
Passu Clause’ Yale Journal of International Law Online Vol. 38 (2013) p. 55, for
excellent case notes.
183
For critical views on the interpretation of pari passu clauses, see Mitu Gulati; Kenneth
N. Klee ‘Sovereign Piracy’ Business Lawyer Vol. 56 (2001) p. 635, taking issue with the
court’s interpretation of pari passu clauses in NML v Argentina’s immediate precedent,
Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Lee
Buchheit; Sofia Martos ‘What to do About Pari Passu’ Butterworths Journal of
International Banking and Financial Law (2014), or Theresa A. Monteleone ‘A Vulture’s
Gamble: High-Stakes Interpretation of Sovereign Debt Contracts in NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Argentina’ Capital Markets Law Journal Vol. 8 (2013) p. 149.
184
For a conventional analysis of interpretation and gap-filling in contracts, see See, e.g.
Ian Ayres; Robert Gertner ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules’ The Yale Law Journal Vol. 99 (1989) p. 87. Experts in the sovereign
debt market have argued that boilerpate contract clauses that are re-used over and over
again cannot be treated as a normal case of gap-filling. See Mitu Gulati; Robert Scott The
3 ½ Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design The University of
Chicago Press, 2013; Mitu Gulati; Kenneth N. Klee ‘Sovereign Piracy’ Business Lawyer
Vol. 56 (2001) p. 635. A study suggests that sophisticated lawyers are prone to
“mythical” and “ritualistic” thinking, which decouples the lawyer’s understanding of
what he is doing from what the clauses indicate. See Mark Weidermaier; Robert Scott;
Mitu Gulati ‘Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu’ Law and Social
Inquiry Vol. 38 Issue 1 (2013) pp. 72-115.
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discuss how the uneven treatment of intra-group debt can endanger
critical functions and jeopardise cross-border coordination of resolution
action (A). Second, we examine how, in order to avoid those problems
with resolution action, ex ante planning tools are deployed to try to
accomplish a balkanization of international banking (B).

A. Cross-border groups and ex-post crisis management: the
risks of uneven treatment for critical functions and crossborder coordination of resolution action
Examining the cross-border, intra-group perspective of bank
resolution and insolvency ranking requires an analysis from two angles,
one concerning policy and principle, and another concerning procedure.
From the perspective of policy and principle, intra-group transactions are
looked at with suspicion. Countries like Spain or Germany subordinate
shareholder loans or intra-group loans and equivalent transactions.
Others, like Italy, subordinate shareholder loans when they are “equity
replacing”, while others have no special treatment. The cross-border
setting adds an inconsistency between the approaches to those intragroup transactions in different jurisdictions. Since cross-border banking
groups continue to report intra-group funding structures, there is a clear
risk if the corresponding rights and liabilities are (i) subject to
subordination; and/or (ii) not treated consistently, with the potential risk
of disrupting basic operations. There are several issues that require our
attention.
The first issue concerns intra-group funding mechanisms through
loans. In countries, like Italy, that only subordinate “equity replacing”
loans, intra-group funding structures could be spared from subordination
by way of interpretation since they do not result in a constant and stable
funding from parent to subsidiaries through debt in a way that resembles
equity financing. On the other hand, in countries where subordination is
automatic, its scope of application may differ between jurisdictions. For
example, in Germany, automatic subordination applies to shareholder
loans185 while, in Spain,186 it applies to all intra-group loans. Thus, even
when an intra-group funding arrangement involves only countries that
have subordination provisions, there is scope for ample disruption of a
group’s basic operations: liabilities against an Italian bank might not be

185
186

Section § 39 (1) 4º-5º, and (4) (5) German Insolvency Act.
Article 92 5º Spanish Insolvency Act.

284

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:245

subordinated, liabilities against a German bank would be subordinated
only if held by the parent company, while liabilities against a Spanish
bank would most likely be subordinated in any case. The potential
disruption of basic operations would be even greater if some entities
were located in countries that do not have subordination provisions but
whose laws may give rise to equitable subordination, e.g. the United
States.187
In addition to the diversity of approaches to statutory subordination,
there is at least one more element of uncertainty. Since statutory
subordination provisions worsen the treatment of debt, parties tend to
circumvent them. In response, courts tend to react by applying a
substance-over-form analysis, which means that the actual scope of the
rules is not clear. This may affect the determination of the “equity
replacing” nature of the loan or the determination of who is a
“shareholder”.188 In Germany, a substance-over-form analysis results in a
de facto extension of the scope of the provision to loans by group entities
controlled by the same shareholder189 (making the scope of statutory
subordination similar to the one in Spain) as well as to loans made by
shareholders that later transfer their holdings190 and to the assignee of the
shareholder loan.191
In the Goldman Sachs v Novo Banco case discussed above, 192 BdP
(the resolution authority) had indicated in a first decision (the “August
decision”) that liabilities incurred towards persons who were also
shareholders of the entity above a 2% threshold would be left behind193
based on provisions applicable to loans by shareholders and related
parties similar to those in Germany or Spain.194 The reason why the

187

See Part I, section III.B.1.
German courts applied a substance-over-form analysis in the past, which makes
189
BGH 21.2.2013 IX ZR 32/12; BGH 18.7.2013 IX ZR 219/11.
190
BGH 15.11.2011 II ZR 6/11.
191
BGH 21.2.2013 IX ZR 32/12.
192
Goldman Sachs v Novo Banco, [2015] EWHC 2371 (Comm). See section II.B.
193
See Goldman Sachs v Novo Banco, [2015] EWHC 2371 (Comm) at 54.
194
Article 145-H (2) of the Title VIII of the Legal Framework of Credit Institutions and
Financial Companies Decree-Law No. 298/92, of 31 December 1992, inserted and
approved under Decree-Law 31- A/2012 of 10 February 2012 (“the Banking Law”) read
as follows: For the following cases, no obligations of the original credit institution may
be transferred to the bridge bank: (a) The respective shareholders, whose participation at
the time of the transfer is equal or greater than 2% of the share capital, the persons or
entities in the two years prior to the transfer, have had interest equal to or greater than 2%
of the capital, members of the board of directors or supervisory, the statutory auditors or
188
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specific loan facility subscribed by Oak Finance was excluded in the
later decision (the “December decision”) was that, in reality, the facility
had been subscribed by Oak Finance Luxembourg on behalf of Goldman
Sachs, which was a shareholder of BES, the resolution entity.195
This can have a dramatic impact on different types of bank funding
beyond intra-group loans. First, if intra-group deposits are characterized
as a loan from the depositor to the depositing entity, they would be
subordinated. This may disrupt an intra-group funding structure, where
different entities may keep deposits with each other, since one deposit
could be treated as an ordinary claim in some countries, a subordinated
claim in others (e.g. Spain) and a privileged claim in others (e.g. Italy, if
deposit preferences apply without any distinction between deposits).
Second, hedging agreements, such as derivatives, should be excluded
in cases where insolvency laws refer to “loans”, unless they are seen as
an indirect means of funding one of the group entities, in which case the
resulting liability could be subordinated not only in countries with
statutory subordination rules, but also in those with equitable
subordination. The problem would persist, however, in countries, like
Spain, which subordinate all related party “claims.”196 The fact that Spain
dispenses privileged treatment to claims resulting from derivative
agreements under certain circumstances197 only makes the contrast more
dangerous. If, say, a transaction involves a hedging agreement between a
Spanish bank and a US bank (outside the group), but the agreement is
backed by another agreement between the US entity and a UK bank that
is part of the same group as the Spanish bank, the agreement could be
recharacterized in Spain and subordinated, while the US entity would
remain committed to paying the UK bank.
The solution could be to rely on collateralized transactions for
funding, liquidity and hedging purposes.198 However, this raises a third

audit firms or people with similar status in other companies in controlling relationship or
group with the institution;
195
Goldman Sachs held a 1,60% in shares, and a remaining percentage in derivatives
positions. The interpretation of those positions as qualifying to establish Goldman Sachs’
interest as a shareholder was also controversial. See Goldman Sachs v Novo Banco,
[2015] EWHC 2371 (Comm) at 57.
196
Article 92 5º Spanish Insolvency Act.
197
If the event of default that prompts the early termination of derivatives contracts
occurs after the defaulting counterparty has filed for insolvency, any claim arising from
those contracts will have priority over ordinary creditors in insolvency. For a detailed
analysis of this privileged treatment, see Part I, section III.A.3.
198
In the EU, entities would try to rely on articles 23 and 25 of the Winding-Up
Directive, as well as on the Financial Collateral Directive. See Part I, section III.A.2.
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problem, where the risk of subordination is compounded by the risk of
avoidance199 and recharacterization, or the risk of an interpretation that
upsets the whole arrangement. In the Lehman Brothers (Extended Liens)
case discussed earlier,200 a custody agreement over securities was
considered to fall outside the scope of protective provisions on Financial
Collateral Arrangements because the collateral taker lacked “control”
over the securities collateral. Instead, the court found that the security
was a floating charge, which enjoyed less protection in the circumstances
of the case. Importantly for our purposes, one of the key facts was that
the clause was copied from a client custody agreement and pasted in an
intra-group agreement for the management of cash and instruments.201
Thus, even if the court did not use an anti-avoidance approach, and even
if it ended classifying the arrangement within an existing type of
security, the end result did not probably fit the group’s needs. Imagine a
cross-border group setting where the entity entrusted with the group’s
treasury is granted a security interest to carry out that role. That security
interest is likely to be a floating security, which is only recognized in
some jurisdictions and receives a different insolvency treatment in each.
This may give rise to serious problems of enforceability and, in a
resolution context, it may cast doubt over the application of bail-in to the
secured liabilities.
The fourth problem may arise with “financial”, i.e. not “operational”
debt, if this is issued by a banking entity and acquired in large amounts
by other group entities. If this is “internal TLAC” debt, the ex post crisis
management will fit with the ex ante planning. The problem may arise if
ordinary senior debt subordinated by statutory provisions ends up
ranking pari passu with internal TLAC that is subordinated (or nonpreferred) by design. Admittedly, if both kinds of debt are held by the
same entity, the problem may be one of increased transaction costs and
not one of disruption of critical functions, but it may upset plans and
undermine trust and confidence in authorities’ ability to accurately
devise resolution plans. The problem may be more serious if “internal
TLAC” debt and ordinary debt are held by different group entities, e.g. if
a German or Spanish bank’s internal TLAC is held by its parent, but part
of its ordinary debt is held by another entity in a different jurisdiction,
199

E.g. article 2497 et seq of the Italian Civil code, which punish the ‘inducement’ of a
parent to a subsidiary to enter into a transaction not in the best interest of that subsidiary.
200
In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe, [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch).
Supra 5.2.2. See also supra 3.1.2.
201
The clause is reproduced in In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe,
[2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) at 32.
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e.g. a US group entity. That ordinary debt could be bailed-in pari passu
with internal TLAC, streaming losses in a way that would not figure in
the group plans, is harming the interest of a different entity.
Even in a regional setting there are few provisions to deal with these
problems. In the EU, BRRD provisions that exclude short-term liabilities
from bail-in make an exception for intra-group debt,202 which would not
only be included in bail-in but have subordinated status. The BRRD also
requires Member States to remove all impediments to intra-group
financial support transactions,203 but it does not look like this mandate is
“actionable”, i.e. it does not seem that one may base a claim of invalidity
against statutory subordination rules on this provision alone. An
interesting question is whether this provision could justify an
interpretation of domestic provisions on statutory subordination of intragroup liabilities that would leave out certain liabilities critical for
operational reasons if a strict application of those rules would result in
such an inconsistent treatment of intra-group transactions that would
hinder any attempts to execute an intra-group support agreement. Such
an interpretation seems unlikely, particularly in a context where intragroup support agreements are conceived for purposes of financing in
times of crisis rather than day-to-day operational financing.204
In a global stage, the treatment of intra-group debt by certain
jurisdictions would be a source of friction with others. It is not difficult
to conceive of the application of subordination provisions by German,
Spanish, Italian or Portuguese authorities as an action susceptible to nonrecognition by authorities in, say, the United States, even under a
principles-based system like the UNCITRAL Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency, which include a public policy exception and a rule to
protect domestic creditors.205 In a discretion-based system like bank
resolution, this would be even more likely.206

202

Article 44 (2) (e) BRRD excludes from bail-in ‘liabilities to institutions, excluding
entities that are part of the same group, with an original maturity of less than seven days’.
203
Article 19 (4) BRRD states that: ‘Member States shall remove any legal impediment
in national law to intra-group financial support transactions that are undertaken in
accordance with this Chapter, provided that nothing in this Chapter shall prevent Member
States from imposing limitations on intra-group transactions in connection with national
laws exercising the options provided for in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, transposing
Directive 2013/36/EU or requiring the separation of parts of a group or activities carried
on within a group for reasons of financial stability.’
204
See Part I, section IV.B.2.
205
Articles 6 (public policy exception to recognition) and 22 (protection of domestic
creditors) UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. They have been applied
in some cases that do not resemble the cases at hand, however.. See e.g. In Ackers v.
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Since the substance of the provisions provides little consolation, the
remedy may be in the procedure if it is robust enough to facilitate
cooperation. A coordinated procedure should be easier in more integrated
regional areas. Within the Eurozone, this is accomplished through partly
centralising decision-making in a single authority, the SRB,207 including
the decision over the recognition of third-country resolution
proceedings.208 Yet even such centralisation is implemented within a
cooperative structure, where consultation is a key element,209 and the
SRB instruct, and national authorities execute.210 In the EU, the
resolution college is the preferred solution to facilitate common
solutions.211 Once the college decides on a “group resolution scheme”,
resolution authorities must implement the decision if they did not
explicitly disagree with it.212 However, resolution authorities can object
and depart from the “group resolution scheme.”213 The system is
structured on a “justificatory” basis, i.e. authorities have discretion, but
disagreeing authorities have to explain their reasons for departing from
the resolution scheme.214 This ensures that decisions are perceived as

Saad Investments Company Limited; in the matter of Saad Investments Company
Limited (in official liquidation) [2013] FCA 738; In re Qimonda (Jaffe v. Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd.) 737 F.3d 14 (2013), CLOUT case no. 1212.
206
In re Sivec SRL, US courts refused to grant recognition to a request to lift a set-off
right in favour of a US creditor, because that creditor would have subordinated status in
Italian proceedings, under a ‘comity’ framework, which is more discretionary than the
UNCITRAL Model Law. See In re Sivec SRL No. 11-80799 476 B.R. 310 (2012).
207
Article 42 SRMR.
208
Article 33 SRMR.
209
Article 31-32 SRMR.
210
See, e.g. article 28 SRMR, on the monitoring uby the SRB of the execution of the
resolution scheme, and article 21, on bail-in powers.
211
Article 88 BRRD.
212
Articles 91 (6) (parent undertaking) and (10) (subsidiaries), as well as 92 (5) BRRD.
213
Article 92 (4) BRRD.
214
Article 92 (4) BRRD states that: ‘If any resolution authority disagrees with or departs
from the group resolution scheme proposed by the group-level resolution authority or
considers that it needs to take independent resolution actions or measures other than those
proposed in the scheme in relation to an institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or
(d) of Article 1(1) for reasons of financial stability, it shall set out in detail the reasons for
the disagreement or the reasons to depart from the group resolution scheme, notify the
group-level resolution authority and the other resolution authorities that are covered by
the group resolution scheme of the reasons and inform them about the actions or
measures it intends to take. When setting out the reasons for its disagreement, that
resolution authority shall give consideration to the resolution plans as referred to in
Article 13, the potential impact on financial stability in the Member States concerned as
well as the potential effect of the actions or measures on other parts of the group.’
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legitimate.215 Underpinning this cooperative procedure is a strong
framework of mutual (and automatic) recognition and a single
jurisdictional system of review, which guarantees the system’s
robustness more than anything.216
Conversely, on a global scale, procedures need to fill the gap left by
the absence of legal principles of mutual recognition (which are present,
however, in cross-border insolvency) and a discretion-based, not lawbased, coordination system. In this context, crisis-management groups
(CMGs) and institution-specific Cooperation Agreements (CoAGs)217
remain non-binding and untested, and focused on information
exchange.218 It is unclear how these structures would work under
pressure or how they would address the problem of the uneven treatment
of intra-group debt on a cross-border basis. In our view, they lack the
tools and the incentives to make the major concessions that would be
necessary to ensure a uniform treatment of debt that preserves critical
functions if the bank has a minimally complex intra-group debt structure.

B. Cross-border groups and ex-ante planning: the
balkanization of banking
Given that large cross-border financial groups constitute the most
major cause of concern for resolution frameworks, the lack of certainty
about how the most elementary aspects of these frameworks would work
is worrying. Resolution frameworks based on strong local authorities
with broad mandate and discretion undermine any attempt to achieve
cooperation based on legal principles.
Legislatures have decided to pull back. Instead of developing more
detailed frameworks for cross-border situations, they have deployed ex
ante planning rules that disincentivize (if not prohibit) “international”
banking groups to the benefit of “multinational” groups.219 In the US,
this has been accomplished through rules that force “foreign banking
organizations with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more and
combined U.S. assets of $10 billion or more” to consolidate them in an

215

See Part I, section II.C.
This is why, when focusing on regional perspectives, we focused on this aspect. See
section II.
217
FSB Key Attributes no. 8.1 and 9. See section II.C.
218
See section II.C.
219
For the different models of international banking, see Part I, section II.A.
216
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Intermediate Holding Company (IHC).220 In the event of resolution, this
IHC will be subject to receivership, or if systemically important, to the
orderly liquidation authority (OLA),221 which would simplify the task.
Due to the decisive choice of a Single-Point-of-Entry strategy,222 US
resolution authorities can anticipate an upstreaming of losses to the IHC,
followed by bail-in.
EU legislative authorities are responding in kind with newly
proposed rules that require banks located in third countries with assets in
the EU beyond a certain size (EUR 30 billion) to consolidate their
holdings through an operating bank, or an IHC.223 These banks should
hold all their assets within the EU area and be subject to the
corresponding licensing requirements, depending on whether they are a
bank or a holding company.224 This constitutes an important modification
to the prior regime, which was based on the assessment of equivalence of
the third-country’s consolidated supervision and the establishment of an
IHC was a measure contemplated for cases of non-equivalence.225
Although the reforms are presented as an improvement on resolvability,
they are seen as retaliation226 for US measures, and they are likely to
have a major impact on UK banks after Brexit.
The measures differ in their respective thresholds used in
determining the obligation to establish an IHC and in their flexibility: for
example, EU rules also permit consolidation under a banking institution.
Yet both types of measures have a similar nature: they try to ensure that
all the companies held in the US, or the EU, are consolidated with a
common IHC. Thus, a foreign bank, even one that has to set up an IHC,
could still carry on banking activities independently through bank
branches.227 This was the subject of the main objection by the ECB in its
220

12 USC 5365; Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and
Foreign Banking Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 17,240 (March 27, 2014).
221
See Part I, section II.B.
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See Part I, section IV.B.1.
223

Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards
exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding
companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital
conservation measures COM/2016/0854 final - 2016/0364 (COD) (hereafter, IHC
proposal).
224
Article 21b of CRD, as it would be modified by the IHC proposal.
225
Article 127 (3) CRD.
226
“EU to retaliate against US bank capital rules” Financial Times November 21, 2016.
227
The Fed prudential rules state that ‘A foreign banking organization would have been
permitted to continue to operate in the United States through branches and agencies
subject to the enhanced prudential standards included in the proposal for U.S. branches
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opinion regarding the proposed reforms, which suggested that foreign
banks fulfilling the requirements in terms of asset size should consolidate
all activities, including those carried on through a branch, in the IHC.228
Indeed, initial evidence suggests that, at least in the US, where the
measures are in place, foreign banks are shifting their assets to foreign
and US bank branches.229
This has clear implications from a crisis-management perspective,
since cross-border resolution would, in practice, be formed by several
regimes, which could apply simultaneously: one for bank debt, where
recognition of bail-in action would be subject to discretionary
forbearance by local resolution authorities; another for bank branches,
over which local resolution authorities would be competent, subject to
limited coordination duties; and a third one for IHCs, where local
resolution authorities would be fully competent. Imagine a large
Eurozone bank with (i) TLAC debt issued by its EU parent company,
which has also subscribed loan facilities all held in part by US investors
and creditors, (ii) a branch in the US, and (iii) an IHC to consolidate its
US and non-US subsidiaries, were to enter resolution. The requirements
for the three different cases could apply separately. Although
coordination would be made easier if both the FDIC and the SRB were,
respectively, the competent authorities in the three cases, it is far from
clear that they could operate smoothly enough to work out a solution,
and tensions on one aspect (e.g. the treatment of US holders of the EU
parent company’s debt) could interfere with another (e.g. the treatment of
bank branch assets and the transfer of resources to creditors in the EU).
Even if the authorities were to behave responsibly, in order to
maximize the value on a global scale, existing planning rules clearly
and agencies of foreign Banks.’ The proposed article 23b (1) states that ‘Member States
shall require that two or more institutions in the Union, which are part of the same third
country group, have an intermediate EU parent undertaking that is established in the
Union.’ (Emphasis added.).
228
In its opinion, the ECB stated that: ‘the requirement should apply to both thirdcountry credit institutions and branches (i.e. also in cases where the Union operations of
the third-country group carried out, partially or exclusively, via branches). Second, once
an intermediate EU parent undertaking is established, it should be a requirement that the
existing branches of the same third-country banking group exceeding a certain threshold
are re-established as branches of a credit institution authorised in the Union to prevent
regulatory arbitrage opportunities, since supervision of third country branches is not
harmonised’. See Opinion of the European Central Bank of 8 November 2017 on
amendments to the Union framework for capital requirements of credit institutions and
investment firms (CON/2017/46) (2018/C 34/05) at 1.7.
229
Lawrence Kreicher; Robert N McCauley “The new US intermediate holding
companies: reducing or shifting assets?” BIS Quarterly Review (March 2018) p. 10.
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pursue an agenda of insulating bank activities on a national, or regional,
basis. The post-crisis concern may have been that global banks relied too
much on wholesale markets to fund local activities, which resulted in
more volatility.230 However, that is different from saying that those same
banking groups left their foreign operations less capitalized than their
local ones, something over which there is no clear evidence. It also
obscures the fact that the current rules that foster multi-national, rather
than global, banks, with self-sufficient local activities, make it more
difficult to reallocate resources to the places that may offer greater
investment opportunities. Before this decisive step was taken, more
evidence would have been desirable about the potential collateral
damage, in terms of opportunities lost.

V. CONCLUSION: THE TREND TOWARDS LARGE, LOCAL, INTERVENED
LIQUIDITY ISLANDS

We began our analysis of the frictions between insolvency law and
bank resolution recalling an old paradox: What happens when an
unstoppable force (a new resolution framework that will prevent the next
financial crisis) meets an immovable object (a standard of fairness that is
reflected in insolvency law)?231 of collision between forces and objects of
incommensurable strength. Our initial message was that the noise of the
collision should not take our attention away from other processes that, in
the shadow of the big, more salient struggle between bank resolution and
insolvency ranking and priorities, could re-shape the face of banking in a
more decisive manner. Having reached this point, we can gather some
conclusions.
The first conclusion confirms our initial intuition: banking reform
depends on discourse. The arguments and conversations in policymaking
circles can change, and are indeed changing, the face of banking. This
discourse is shaped by an argument about the collision between ending
too-big-to-fail and protecting legitimate expectations. The major priority
of bank reform is the need for harmony between financial stability,
avoidance of contagion, and protection of taxpayers, which are the goals
that shape bank resolution; and fairness towards creditors and protection
of pre-existing commitments, which are the needs that shape insolvency.
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Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking
Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 17,240 (March 27, 2014) at 17,264.
231
See Part I, section I.
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However, behind this argument, a series of parallel conversations
about the measures that could help achieve harmony and coordination
between those seemingly colliding goals is taking place, often less
noticeably. In our view, those parallel conversations have an even greater
potential to change the face of banking. Yet, as in the children’s game
“telephone,” where a message is whispered from one player to another,
some may be surprised (though not amused) as the final version of the
message is delivered to the expectant crowd. As a blunt summary, the
rules promote a system of large, domestic banks that function as ringfenced liquidity pools, while keeping a tight relationship with public
authorities. To operate this shift, other things are changing in the process,
sometimes dramatically, and not always in a good way. To understand
how and why, we have used an analytical framework that considers the
different dimensions of the problem sequentially: the basic problem, and
its “external” and “intra-group” dimension; the dimension of the
relationship between ex ante preventive rules, and ex post crisismanagement rules; and the dimension of the domestic v. cross-border
context.
We began our analysis with a simple dichotomy: banks are too
complex, and any crisis management tools need to be deployed quickly
to avoid contagion, preserve critical functions to avoid collapse, and
write down equity and liabilities (bail-in) to avoid taxpayer losses, while
simultaneously respecting basic notions of fairness instilled in the rules
that determine creditor hierarchy in insolvency. Jurisdictions that have
adopted frameworks to deal with bank crises have chosen different levels
of interference upon, and coordination with, insolvency rules. The ones
with the more intrusive stance, such as the US, the EU and Switzerland,
face a problem of conflicting policies, which translates into a friction at
the level of interpretative principles. These frictions can arise every time
the status of a liability for bail-in purposes is called into question.
In this setting, concepts such as “deposit”, “secured obligation”, or
“client money” can be a battleground of value-laden conceptions, each of
which will tip the scales in favour of one policy goal, principle, or
interest over another. In parallel, the interplay between resolution
provisions that focus on “groups” and the rules for the subordination of
related-party liabilities in some countries is uncertain. In such cases,
whether the result is “the” correct one in substance can be as important
as whether the decision is legitimate from a procedural and discursive
perspective, which considers all relevant arguments, of policy and of
principle. Still, even if the legitimacy of the process were to ensure
robust decisions, a stable framework for the interplay between bank
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resolution and insolvency ranking, and priorities were to emerge, this
could take time, and the potential risks still could not be ruled out.
The second logical step of the conflict is to try to prevent the
collision from happening in the first place. At the “external” level, banks
are required to issue a new layer of debt that guarantees loss-absorbency
(TLAC, or MREL in the EU) so that the uncomfortable questions about
the bail-in of operational, or client-related, liabilities never arise. At an
intra-group level, bank groups are required to have a suitable group
structure and an adequate distribution of “internal” TLAC to ensure that
losses are allocated to the entity that is eventually put into resolution, be
it a single holding company (Single Point of Entry) or several entities
within the group (Multiple Points of Entry).
This process, however, raises fundamental questions about the way
the entities design TLAC or MREL debt, about the rights of clients that
acquire that debt, and about the powers of public authorities. The new
framework, especially in the US, favours a vertical organisation with a
parent holding company, regardless of what is efficient for the group’s
business model. In the EU, the rules benefit large groups, with access to
international capital markets and institutional investors, while squeezing
smaller competitors, regardless of what is good for society. All this is
subject to rules whose open-texture seems to tolerate an unprecedented
level of public interference in banking groups’ structures and strategic
decisions, which stakes all limits and safeguards to a principles-based
interpretation, to effect a court review based on the rationality of the
authorities’ justification, the appropriateness of the measures, and their
proportionality.
The more dramatic changes, however, are operated when we
consider the domestic versus cross-border dimension of the problem.
Resolution is justified by the need to have specific tools that protect
certain interests better than insolvency tools do. Yet this logic is flawed
when transferred to a cross-border setting because the alternative to a
robust yet suboptimal framework for cross-border insolvency is a
patchwork quilt of non-binding agreements between authorities, private
sector solutions and good faith, where resolution authorities enjoy broad
and unilateral discretion. All these elements undermine the robustness of
this alternative framework. Far from being deluded into a false sense of
security, legislatures have deepened into territorialist solutions to protect
“their” savers, e.g. by protecting local deposits. The fact that
territorialism is the default principle does not bode well for the crossborder enforcement of insolvency priorities in other cases, e.g. trying to
exclude liabilities subject to bespoke security arrangements from bail-in,
the cross-border recognition of insolvency ranking, or situations where
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there may be offerings of subordinated or non-preferred debt subject to
the laws of different jurisdictions. Territorialism is a slippery slope, and
the awareness of the risk of non-recognition and lack of coordination has
led legislatures to deploy ex ante measures that try to prevent the
problem by requiring large institutions to hold assets located in the
relevant jurisdiction within intermediate holding companies (IHCs). By
being subject to prudential requirements, these IHCs are turned into
liquidity pools, or, more accurately, liquidity islands. Applying the socalled “international trilemma” to our analysis, it becomes clear that,
instead of diluting the powers of domestic resolution authorities through
a strong coordination framework, lawmakers have strengthened those
powers. This risks global financial stability to the benefit of local
financial stability. In the trilemma of national authorities, global financial
stability and global banks, the latter are being sacrificed.
A system that was conceived to end “too-big-to-fail” is on course to
achieving its goal, but through an unexpected path. This path is changing
the face of banking in ways that may not have been anticipated, and
which may not necessarily be for the better. Put shortly, resolution
frameworks were created to avoid Lehman-like bankruptcies. Years later,
a formidable edifice is in place, but one that cannot deal with a Lehmanlike bankruptcy. Instead, the rules try to end Lehman-like banks, which
may be good, but they do so by taking steps that may be more
questionable. Banking groups are becoming easier to dispose of,
insolvency systems of ranking and priorities less relevant, and greater
ring-fencing of resources will hinder capital mobility.
In addition, banks now need to place large amounts of debt in the
market, which, for smaller banks (at least in Europe) means a choice
between placing it among their clients (risking investor protection) or
increasing their size to reach international capital markets and
institutional investors. Larger banks will be more co-dependent with the
State, especially since it is intervention by public authorities that
determines their funding needs and corporate structure. The relationship
between banks and State will be further strengthened by the territorialist
choices made in the cross-border context. Having strong resolution
authorities with ample powers makes sense in a domestic setting. In a
global setting, it makes rules-based and principles-based cooperation
more difficult, which endangers global stability, unless global banks give
way to multi-national banks.
These trade-offs are not straightforward and should be the subject of
debate. That debate is not happening because the problem is too
complex, has too many ramifications, and each of them is part of a
separate conversation. In this two-part article, we have presented an
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analytical framework that considers those ramifications sequentially as
different dimensions of the problem that pile upon each other. By picking
those dimensions apart and analysing them separately, the choices will
not be easier, but at least they will be clearer. It is our hope that a better,
more robust resolution framework will be the outcome.

